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Oregon State University has recently updated the Advanced Plant Experiment (APEX)
facility to serve as a justiﬁably-scaled version of the Westinghouse AP1000 reactor as part
of the light water reactor sustainability program. In lieu of the light-water sustainability
program for the validation of next-generation system safety analysis codes, much interest
lies in the ability to eﬃciently perform band-to-band uncertainty comparison using mod-
ern, robust methods capable of quantitatively assessing reactor safety margins. To meet
this challenge, best estimate codes such as RELAP7 and TRACE6.0 are being devel-
oped at the DOE national laboratories. Advanced thermal hydraulic simulation engines
present the core capability of such next-generation safety analysis codes (NGSAC). The
NGSAC is subject to a stringent veriﬁcation, validation (V&V) and uncertainty quan-
tiﬁcation (UQ) process. This includes code validation on data form prototypical integral
eﬀects test (IET) experiments. The following analysis presents a thoroughly researched
and justiﬁed simulation of a primary feed-and-bleed’s eﬀectiveness in responding to a
loss-of-feedwater accident, granting a large amount of high-quality simulation data avail-
able for both NGSAC and ITF validation.
1.1 Research Objective
The primary objective of the following research is to perform a justiﬁed uncertainty quan-
tiﬁcation of regulated response functions of a primary feed-and-bleed IET in support of
the light-water sustainability program and the NGSAC. The response function of concern
is the maximum cladding temperature in the hottest region of the core. Driving factors
of this response function include power decay regimes, core geometry, and operating
coolant conditions. To achieve a properly justiﬁed safety margin using a best-estimate
plus uncertainty analysis, the following goals are completed in order:
• Determine the applicable thermal-hydraulic code based upon known reactor condi-
tions and transient data. Extend the knowledge of applicability by comparing the2
results of a phenomenon identiﬁcation and ranking table (PIRT) and the prospec-
tive code’s model and correlations quality evaluation (MC/QE) document.
• Develop a high-ﬁdelity nodalization of the plant under analysis by performing an it-
erative comparison against both separate and integral eﬀects tests. The assessment
matrix of experimental data is used to determine scaling issues when extrapolating
results to full-scale nuclear power plants.
• Develop or utilize a pre-existing sampling method to determine the number of sim-
ulations required to reach the prescribed criterion for knowledge. Users and experts
must come to a sensible agreement on uncertainty applied to PIRT-derived input
parameters. Sensitivity studies are then performed to maximize the knowledge of
uncertain input parameters before completing the ﬁnal uncertainty propagation.
This investigation used these steps in line the the requirements outlined in the Code
Scaling, Applicability, and Uncertainty (CSAU) Method outlined by the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). Speciﬁc modiﬁcations were made in the
derivation of sampling requirements by using the Bayesian, or subjective, paradigm of
statistics in order to include prior knowledge. In this way, the CSAU method itself can be
said to have been modernized, in that functionality has been increased while the elimina-
tion of previous sampling techniques has enabled a decrease in mathematical complexity.
1.2 Method of Analysis and Limitations
The Symbolic Nuclear Analysis Package (SNAP) is used in conjunction with the sta-
tistical analysis capabilities of the DAKOTA code to drive both the sensitivity analysis
and uncertainty propagation. This limits the types of statistical correlations that may
be produced and also the type of uncertainty propagation. As such, only linear product-
moment correlations are used in making inferences about the degree of relation between
code inputs and outputs. Studies in literature generally agree that the usefulness of using
these methods in sensitivity studies is highly dependent upon the number of samples.[7]
Furthermore, the SNAP interface forces the user to conduct the uncertainty analysis
using forward uncertainty propagation (FUP), a black-box method. This is considered3
acceptable in light of the usage of CSAU, as it remains the historical method of justifying
proper uncertainty accumulation in this methodology of safety margin quantiﬁcation.
RELAP5 Mod 3.3 is the frozen version of computation software used to perform the
integral-eﬀects-test simulations of the thermal-hydraulics for the OSU APEX facility.
This version of the code was chosen for its ability to expedite the simulations of com-
plex ﬂuid conditions, and its ability to hook into the SNAP interface, thereby allowing
the number of code iterations to become tractable. The expediting is achieved using
a lumped-parameter approach within RELAP5, where variables which are realistically
spatially-distributed are "lumped" into single scalars, as opposed to vectors. This results
in a simpliﬁed mathematical model, while simultaneously reducing the spacial resolution
of the simulations. This approach has been shown to be very powerful throughout the
literature, and IET comparisons with experimental APEX transient data have conﬁrmed
RELAP5 to predict the timings of phenomenological windows.[37]
Limitations known to lead to signiﬁcant discrepancies such as ECCS mixing capabili-
ties, stable ﬁlm boiling temperature correlations, and the implementation of conservative
heat transfer coeﬃcients such as the Forslund-Roshenow correlation are directly treated
in the CSAU method as biases and uncertainties. This aids in reducing the eﬀect of
RELAP5 limitations when justifying the safety margin, so long as the biases themselves
are thoughtfully reasoned.
A pre-existing model of the major primary and secondary components and systems is
available has has been recently qualiﬁed using both hot-leg (HL) and cold-leg (CL) small-
break loss-of-coolant accidents (SB-LOCAs). While certain extraneous systems such as
a chemical and volume control (CVC) line required development for this analysis, it has
been assumed that primary nodalization is qualiﬁed to justify the uncertainty results.
The introduction of Bayesian inference into the CSAU methodology has granted the
ability to include prior information in the form of probabilistic data. While this feature
has been utilized, it has been assumed that previous data in terms of system success
probabilities are not frequentest-speciﬁc. Using this assumption, these probabilities have
been applied in a subjective manner using an unbiased, relatively non-informative prior4
distribution in part to avoid argument and to retain the ability for data to shape the
outcome.
Resulting safety margins obtained as part of the light-water reactor sustainability
program are currently exclusive to the primary feed-and-bleed in response to a total
LOFW accident. The APEX facility is scaled in a manner unique to other AP1000
integral test facilities to retain ﬁdelity in certain characteristic phases of the AP1000
system response. As such, the technical speciﬁcations identiﬁed in the following study
are solely applicable to APEX.
1.3 Overview of the Following Chapters
In Chapter II, an extensive literature review is presented which permits a broad under-
standing of both the history of the best-estimate plus uncertainty approach to licensing
and an overview of current methodologies competing with the NRC CSAU approach.
The groundbreaking application of CSAU by the NRC and Technical Program Group
(TPG) is assessed in detail and compared to the modernized approach.
Chapter III formally describes the APEX facility and its primary components and
capabilities. The history and signiﬁcance of APEX in the nuclear industry as a whole is
assessed.
The description of primary feed-and-bleed cooling of pressurized water reactors is
covered in Chapter IV. This includes both the theory justifying its use in response to a
loss-of-feedwater accident and its application to the APEX facility. An operating map is
developed which dictates the conditions under which the feed-and-bleed is expected to
be successful for APEX.
Chapter V describes in detail the phenomenon identiﬁcation and ranking table (PIRT)
process and how this was achieved for APEX. The oﬃcial PIRT is outlined for each
region of the core, justifying the inclusion/exclusion of input parameters based upon
APEX experience and literature review. The chapter is concluded with a summary of
the RELAP5-treatable input parameters complete with their probability density distri-5
butions and application rules.
Chapter VI concerns the nodalization of the APEX facility using RELAP5 Mod 3.3
and the alterations made for the feed-and-bleed transient. Formal qualiﬁcation of the
APEX primary deck is presented based upon previous simulation and experimental com-
parisions. The role of SNAP and concept of the job stream is discussed and demonstrated
by performing a preliminary sensitivity analysis using product-moment correlations. The
Binomial Bayesian method is outlined and derived in full to produce a table of necessary
samples required to reach the 95/95 criterion for a single response function.
The simulation response functions analyzed under uncertainty are presented and dis-
cussed in Chapter VII. The results are separated into a series of sensitivity studies based
upon human actions. A single nominal study is presented to justify the long-term implica-
tions of the primary feed-and-bleed which is computationally unfeasible when performing
an uncertainty analysis. Inferences made concerning the physical phenomenon develop-
ing in the system are presented though discussion.
A broad summary of the results and CSAU eﬀectiveness is discussed in Chapter VIII.6
Chapter 2: Survey of Relevant Literature
2.1 History of Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty Quantiﬁcation
Previous to 1988, USNRC design certiﬁcations and decisions based on accident analysis
included highly conservative methods and assumptions. This philosophy of certiﬁcation
naturally limited the scope in which a utility could operate an NPP, due to the bounding
on parameters such as discharge burnup, fuel cycle length, power up-rating, use of axial
blankets, etc. The U.S. NRC published the conservative approach for licensing proce-
dures to rule reactor Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) analysis in 10CFR50.46
and Appendix K in 1974.[11] To follow this rule, conservative computer codes, such
as COBRA, RELAP2 and NOTRUMP, were developed based on conservative physical
models, correlations and assumptions due to the lack of deep understanding of physical
phenomena characteristic of a thermal-hydraulic transient. Through the advancement of
theoretical and experimental investigations, best-estimate system safety analysis codes
were developed to represent realistic physical phenomena in reactor transients, including
RELAP5, TRACE, TRAC/COBRA, and others.
With the advent of best estimate thermal-hydraulic codes in the 1970’s and 80’s, much
progress was made in understanding the behavior and characteristic phenomena of the
ECCS in responding to design-basis accidents. A roughly ﬁfteen year multidisciplinary,
international sudy on ECCS behavior in the wake of reactor transients culminated in a
ﬁnal detailed report.[10] It was universally determined that the current methods commen-
surate with 10CFR50.46 were overly conservative, and that modern best-estimate codes
were acceptable for predicting characteristic changes in system parameters assuming a
quality-assured model. It was now possible to develop and calibrate virtual, nodalized
models of an NPP, and recreate the response of ﬁgures of merit under transient condi-
tions. The USNRC responded by amending the ECCS acceptance criteria for light-water
reactors (10.CFR.50.46) to allow the use of best estimate codes so long as the uncer-
tainty was quantiﬁed and justiﬁed.[48] This legislative approach has been named the7
Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty (BEPU) approach, and has been adopted in various dif-
ferent forms internationally. The BEPU approach has since been adopted as a standard
method of uncertainty analysis by the IAEA.[8][3] Considering no structured program to
justiﬁably quantify code uncertainty existed at the time, the USNRC and its contrac-
tors and consultants developed a specialized committee known as the Technical Program
Group (TPG) in order to forge such a program. The multi-disciplinary TPG consisted of
experts in the ﬁelds of thermal-hydraulics, sensitivity analysis, uncertainty propagation,
and NPP design and were derived from U.S. commercial and academic institutions.
2.2 Development of the Code Scaling, Applicability, and Uncertainty
Method
Nearly two years following the ECCS amendment, the TPG released a landmark series of
six papers describing the newly-constructed code scaling, applicability, and uncertainty
(CSAU) method of quantifying reactor safety margins.[6] [53] [54] [38] [40] [31] The TPG
presented CSAU as a structured, traceable, and practical set of guidelines to follow.
Nearly all the steps in the CSAU road map were given moderately equivocal criterion to
account for the uniqueness of individual NPP’s, best estimate codes, and expert opin-
ion. The TPG constructed CSAU to cover the assessment of generation II light water
reactors only, but today it remains limited only by the capabilities of the chosen thermal-
hydraulic code. The TPG determined that operators of any LWR stand to beneﬁt if
increased safety margins can be justiﬁed using a BEPU approach. [24] [47] The TPG
outlined three signiﬁcant elements of CSAU application fragmented into fourteen total
steps. The three elements consist of the frozen code capability/applicability determi-
nation, the assessment and ranging of parameters, and uncertainty quantiﬁcation. The
signiﬁcant steps involved in each element of CSAU are summarized below.
The code selection element begins with the selection of a particular phenomenon to
be analyzed, and the NPP to undergo the respective transient. This allows for a proper
phenomenon identiﬁcation and ranking table (PIRT) to be constructed as per step three,
where the most important and inﬂuential input parameters in relation to the transient are
listed in descending order. While the PIRT is both time-consuming and often subjective,
it allows the iterative steps in later elements to remain realistic while signiﬁcantly driving8
down costs. Once the transient and its characteristic phenomenon have been established,
a thermal-hydraulic code and its documents are reviewed to determine its capability of
reproducing the transient. Finally, the code applicability is determined by expert agree-
ment over the accuracy of databases, relations, and scale-up capabilities built into the
code. This step ensures the code wields the ability to accurately determine the ﬁgures of
merit with a high degree of conﬁdence.
Element two involves the mating of computational and experimental data in an eﬀort
to calibrate the NPP calculations using the thermal-hydraulic code chosen in element
one. The ﬁrst step in this element (step 7) involves the creation of an assessment ma-
trix of integral and separate eﬀects test (IET) (SET) data from the scale facility. This
matrix is then utilized in the iterative step 8 where nodalization changes are made based
on criterion placed on the comparison toolbox using computational and experimental
results. Many calibration mechanisms have been proposed such as the semi-classical
D’Auria Fast-Fourier Transform (DFFT) method and subjective probabilistic (Bayesian)
methods.[39] However, most modern analyses allow the NPP nodalization to remain static
while thermal-hydraulic parameters relating to mass, energy, and momentum transfer are
varied.[44] The model is eventually considered mature when one or many ﬁgures of merit
become large and remain steady following iterations.
The third and ﬁnal element is where code and experimental uncertainty quantiﬁca-
tion and sensitivity analysis occurs. At both the time of CSAU development and present
day, thermal-hydraulic code limitations lend uncertainty quantiﬁcation to occur through
the process of forward uncertainty propagation. This process was ﬁrst formalized by the
TPG, and involves treating the computation as a black box, where input parameters and
geometric properties deemed pertinent through the PIRT process are given uncertainty
distributions, and initial conditions are randomly drawn from these distributions. Nat-
urally, multiple code runs are required in order to yield output data and distributions
with a high degree of ﬁdelity.
The variation parameters relating to the reactor’s initial conditions forms the bulk of
the uncertainty quantiﬁcation in the CSAU approach, and much of the work in previous
elements ensures justiﬁcation and applicability of this step. Once the variation is com-9
pleted, the CSAU approach dictates that additional uncertainty should be appended to
the previous result when scaling distortion and code accuracy eﬀects can be quantiﬁed.
These uncertainties are labeled code biases, and they work to ensure a proper degree of
conservatism is accounted for. Scaling distortion is quantiﬁed via the diﬀerence in code
output between scaled and full-scale nodalization. Code accuracy is accrued when data
is available to quantify the limitations of the code database used in the development of
thermal-hydraulic models and correlations embedded in the program. The biases and
uncertainty propagation results are then combined in a systematic manner typically rely-
ing on the chosen ﬁgure of merits. In the case of an LB-LOCA analysis, one is typically
concerned with the peak cladding temperature (PCT) over the course of the transient.
Therefore, the uncertainty in the value due to distortion and correlation limitations is
added to the results garnered from the propagation calculations.
In 1989, RG1.157 was published to establish the acceptable standard for uncertainty
analysis.[11] Regardless of the method chosen to statistically ﬁt and draw from the code
results, the revised federal regulation guide dictates the 95th percentiles of a parameter
distribution to adequately represent uncertainty in the value. The act of concerning one-
self with the 95% quantiles about the mean was justiﬁed on the grounds of consistency
with standard engineering practice in regulatory matters involving thermal hydraulics.
More so, the NRC has determined through previous studies involving a probabilistic
approach to departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) estimation that the 95%
probability level is adequate.[27] As to be described further in Section 2.5, the 95% quan-
tiles are acceptable when using the regression or response-surface approach to response
function modeling. The advent of non-parametric and subjective statistical applications
to uncertainty propagation (See Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3) have called for the conﬁdence
in the probability to be quantiﬁed as well. The notation 95/95 is frequently used to
denote the 95th percentile of aleatory variability yielding 95% conﬁdence, or epistemic
uncertainty. The conﬁdence level is speciﬁed to account for the possible inﬂuence of the
sampling error due to the fact that the statements are obtained from a random sample
of limited size. In the case one is interested in a parameter wielding only one pivotal tol-
erance limit such as the PCT, the 95th percentile of the cumulative distribution function
is often used. The original road map developed by the TPG for applying CSAU to an
LWR transient is shown below in Figure 2.1. As depicted, the analysis is complete when10
a statement or error band is developed for an output parameter regarding its discrete or
continuous nature, respectively. A quick description of the inaugural demonstration of
the CSAU method is summarized in Sub-Section 2.7.1.
Figure 2.1: The traditional 14-step application of CSAU to a reactor transient.11
2.3 Code Validation
Following the quantiﬁcation of uncertainty in the computational model, the output re-
quires formalized validation against experimental data. In the years following the advent
of best-estimate codes, the USNRC has mandated diﬀerent levels of validation commen-
surate with the ability to quantify uncertainties. In the years preceding the development
of CSAU and other BEPU assessment schemes, a line-to-line validation was required, in
which the continuous output of the code was compared directly with continuous experi-
mental data. Due to the primitive nature of methods devoted to quantifying both com-
putational and experimental uncertainty, no error bands were required in this validation
scheme. The commanding regulation of the line-to-line validation is located in NUREG-
1737, Appendix C, where the level of ﬁt is separated into four tiers labeled excellent,
reasonable, minimal, and insuﬃcient agreement. Excellent and reasonable agreement
are largely characterized by the code’s ability to predict a phenomenon’s response to a
transient, and that inferences may be made from the data.[42] Minimal agreement occurs
when certain phenomenon are not correctly predicted, allowing the potential for incor-
rectly drawn conclusions using the data. Data determined to wield a minimal agreement
with IET data is not acceptable.
Excellent agreement denotes the ability for the experimental data relating to major phe-
nomenon to lie almost entirely within the experimental uncertainty band, with few ex-
ceptions. This acceptance criteria was the result of the USNRC’s increase in validation
requirements, where band-to-line analyses are now standard. This change was made fol-
lowing the introduction and optimization of the CSAU method, granting analysis the
ability to methodically perform transient analysis while minimizing cost. In band-to-line
validation, the experimental data is aligned with the nominal-valued calculation and the
95/95 upper and lower tolerance limits. The major phenomenon is limited mostly to peak
cladding temperature, upper plenum pressure, mass ﬂow rate, and mass distribution. Fea-
tures requiring signiﬁcant agreement include transients (transition of phases), slopes, and
inﬂection points which denote signiﬁcant alterations in the major phenomenon.
In the near future, next generation BEPU codes including RELAP7 and TRACE6.0
will enable validation at the band-to-band level from inside the code architecture. In
band-to-band validation, the analyst attempts to quantify code uncertainty and ensure
envelopment by the uncertainty of the experimental data. This method of validation is12
currently not a US regulatory requirement due to the often prohibitive cost involved.
Band-to-band validation may be performed with legacy codes such as RELAP5 by us-
ing the forward uncertainty propagation methods described in Section 2.5. While the
band-to-band method provides a better understanding of the code accuracy, it will be a
challenge to quantify experimental uncertainty. This is especially so for legacy experi-
mental data, as some facilities are not active anymore.
2.4 International and Commercial Alternatives to CSAU
In the years following the unveiling of the CSAU method, developed jointly by the NRC
and TPG, various researchers in industry and academia have both optimized and over-
hauled CSAU allowing quantiﬁcation of reactor safety margins to become more accessible
and robust. Roughly six methodologies are currently actively pursued that make use of
either black-box or semi-intrusive white-box calculations.[44] Only a narrow description
of these alternatives and their relation to CSAU are given below.
2.4.1 Gesellschat Fur Anlagen-und Reaktorsicherheit
The ﬁrst UQ concept to gain signiﬁcant international attention was the Gesellschat Fur
Anlagen-und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) method developed in Germany. The proof-of-
concept was included in the landmark paper by Glaeser et. al., where 53 input parameter
uncertainties were propagated in an uncertainty methods study of the LSTF.[21] GRS
only signiﬁcantly departs from the traditional CSAU approach shown in Figure 2.1 in
that thermal-hydraulic models and correlations are iterated. Subjective probability in
the form of a conﬁdence value is given to alternatives models such as the Wilson drift
model and the ﬂooding-based drift-ﬂux model. Once a model is chosen, uncertainty bands
derived from scale-facility experiments are applied to ﬂow correlations and propagated
through the code.13
2.4.2 Automated Statistical Treatment of Uncertainty Method
Another popularized black-box approach to UQ is the Automated Statistical Treatment
of Uncertainty Method (ASTRUM), a method typically concerned with break analysis
of pressurized water reactors. ASTRUM was originally conceived at Westinghouse, and
was the initial methodology to make use of non-parametric methods of input sampling
which is now a staple of the modern CSAU approach.[26] Diﬀerentiation of the sam-
pling paradigms is described in Section 2.5. Speciﬁcally, the Wilks formula is used to
achieve the 95/95 criterion required of the output. WCOBRA/TRAC is exclusively used
as the frozen code within ASTRUM, yet the conservative biases predicted by this code
is discarded.[44] The remainder of the method is directly derived from the traditional
CSAU approach with slight modiﬁcations where data from previous Westinghouse anal-
yses are used to modify key input parameters. One such example is the supposed normal
distribution characterizing a HTC multiplier to the fuel during temperature excursions
occurring in the blow-down phase. This was justiﬁed following the review of experimental
data following several scaled LB-LOCA experiments of 4-loop designs.
2.4.3 Uncertainty Method based on Accuracy Extrapolation
The Italian-conceived Uncertainty Method based on Accuracy Extrapolation (UMAE)
requires far greater computational eﬀort than previously mentioned methods. Rather
than propagate uncertainty through the code based upon input variability, UMAE com-
putes uncertainty based upon accuracy derived from comparison with integral eﬀects test
data. This is achieved following qualiﬁcation of the nodalization and model parameters
via special procedures contained in the methodology. In doing so, the eﬀect of mild user
modeling errors on the underlying uncertainty is minimized. Following qualiﬁcation, the
output of the code is assigned an accuracy statement using ﬁgures of merit derived from
the D’Auria FFT method.[20] Code runs deemed accurate enough for analysis are com-
pared to IET data in frequency space using Fourier transform methods. Ideally, models
are scaled to correspond and undergo comparison with diﬀerently scaled facilities un-
dergoing similar phenomenon. After deriving uncertainties from the frequency domain,
overall code uncertainty becomes a superposition of diﬀerences between the model and14
IET data.
2.4.4 Integrated Methodology on Thermal Hydraulics Uncertainty
Analysis
The most modern safety margin assessment method, and the only to actively utilize
subjective probability, is the Integrated Methodology on Thermal Hydraulics Uncertainty
Analysis (IMTHUA) scheme. Developed in 2007 at the University of Maryland, IMTHUA
seeks to iterate upon model nodalizations and parameters using Bayesian inference, where
code output, scaled IET data, and prior judgment seek to quantitatively describe the
subjective uncertainty in the output representation.[43] The code uncertainties are treated
via the propagation of internal sub-model uncertainties into the calculation. As such, the
method requires a degree of knowledge in relation to the thermal-hydraulic (TH) code’s
internal structure. A case study has been carried out in order to prove the IMTHUA
concepts applicability to real-world application. [22]
2.5 Forward Uncertainty Propagation
While no formal structure has been determined as to how input sampling is to be per-
formed under the modern CSAU approach, all viable methods utilize the philosophy of
forward uncertainty propagation (FUP) . The term FUP is synonymous with the black-
box method of uncertainty assessment where sampling matrices are generated before any
simulations are performed. Methods used to generate sampling matrices are described
in Sub-Sections 2.5.1 - 2.5.3 below. Model correlations and relations are completely
unknown or ignored in FUP. Simulations are then run a speciﬁed number of times or
until proper convergence has been made on a posterior predictive distribution. As such,
the crux of the eﬀort spent in performing FUP is centered upon wrapping the chosen
thermal-hydraulic code in parametric subroutines where the results of sampling matrices
are collected and driven through statistical analyses. Figure 2.2 demonstrates the basic
philosophy of FUP. Alternative practices to FUP have been designated "glass-box" or
"white-box" methodologies, and are utilized by UMAE and IMTHUA schemes described
in Sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.3, respectively. Glass-box methods gain eﬃciency by assessing15
uncertainty in the correlations used by the TH code directly. However, programmer ac-
cess to code subroutines is typically prohibited during run-time. Limitations in current
TH codes make the implementation of glass-box methods signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult, ef-
fectively balancing or canceling out the eﬃciency gained in requiring less simulations.
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Figure 2.2: The code as a black box, which receives random inputs and receives a statis-
tical set of outputs
2.5.1 Parametric Response Surfaces
The method of parametric sampling is typically referred to as response surface (RS) de-
velopment, which is not to be confused with the response functions of an uncertainty
analysis. Response surface development was ﬁrst supported in the ﬁrst application of
CSAU by the TPG in the proof-of-concept report.[38] The development was spurred by
the lack of a formalized statistical method to analytically predict the number of runs
required to reach the 95/95 criterion. In order to technically achieve an upper and lower
95% tolerance limit, a parametric ﬁt using a multinomial least-squares method is gener-
ated to the response function "knot points" where sampled input data is known. As such,
a response such as peak cladding temperature may be written, PCT = f(x1,x 2,...,x N),
where N denotes the number of varied input parameters. A major issue exists in RS devel-16
opment of computational output when one becomes interested in the quality of ﬁt. This
is the result of the deterministic nature of computers, where no random variability (ex-
cluding voltage failures) is witnessed. In other words, applying identical input conditions
will always lead to the same knot point used in development of the RS. Traditionally, the
level of error or residue in a least-squares ﬁt can be determined by calculating the root
mean square (RMS). This is precisely where a trade-oﬀ begins, as the value of the RMS
can be driven to zero as the order of the polynomial is increased. Increasing the order
of the polynomial yields a direct eﬀect on the number of samples, or code runs, required
to adequately formulate the RS. Lellouche et. al. predicted that nearly 2000 calcula-
tions would be required to satisfy a three-level polynomial wielding a central composite
design.[38] While the computational cost of a single thermal-hydraulic simulation using
TRAC or other TH codes has greatly diminished, 2000 runs remains prohibitively expen-
sive. When applying an RS to the output, analysts are faced with the task of remaining
conservative in the wake of inadequate inferences resulting from poor parametric ﬁts to
the data. As described in detail in Section 2.7.1, the TPG resorted to absorbing 50% of
the probability at the nominal point, and performing pump and break calculations that
were expected to increase the PCT above the nominal calculation.
In order to glean probability density data from the RS, software may be used to rapidly
perform Monte Carlo (MC) or Latin-Hypercube sampling from the surface. This form of
sampling, as opposed to weighted sampling such as Latin-Hypercube Sampling (LHS) ,
is appropriate for response surfaces since the system is simply algebraic. The number of
samples required for convergence of the mean is highly dependent on the data and the
number of input parameters. However, it has been suggested that the variation following
50,000 samples can be regarded as negligible.[38] Fortunately, the computational cost
involved in MC sampling is relatively inexpensive. Once a set of MC samples has been
acquired, the user may then parse the data using basic statistical software to determine
the upper and lower 95% tolerance limits. This method of meeting the safety margin
criteria was ﬁrst marketed by the USNRC and TPG, and continues as a viable method
for quantifying reactor safety margins.17
2.5.2 The Wilks Method
In recent years, the use of non-parametric methods to determine the number of sam-
pling sizes has been gaining increased attention. The Wilks method has become the
standard of non-parametric techniques due to its ability to predict sampling sizes com-
mensurate with the requested number of response functions.[44] Sampling requirements
gleaned from the Wilks formula are much smaller than those required for good-ﬁtting
polynomial ﬁts, and do not rely on the number of input parameters nor their uncertainty
distributions. Westinghouse was the ﬁrst to utilize the Wilks formula in the development
of the ASTRUM assessment scheme. (see Section 2.4.2) Over the preceding decade, other
schemes including GRS and IMTHUA have become built around sampling according to
the Wilks method. CSAU has been modiﬁed to account for sampling according to the
Wilks method, while retaining the legacy response surface technique applied in the proof
of concept analysis.
The Wilks method was originally derived by S.S. Wilks in 1941 and 1942 using or-
der statistics to account for the natural variability in manufacturing processes once the
removal of known causes of variation, (i.e. statistical control), was reached.[51][52] A set
of equations were derived to determine the number of samples that would need to be
measured/analyzed to know with a speciﬁed probability that a desired proportion of any
continuous population is encompassed by the extremes of the sample. The conﬁdence
level is speciﬁed to account for the possible inﬂuence of the sampling error due to the
fact that the statements are obtained from a random sample of limited size. Two sepa-
rate equations were derived regarding whether the analyst is interested in constraining
the response under one or two-sided tolerance limits. Furthermore, it was shown how
the Wilks formula is determined analytically as the number of desired response functions
increases.[52] A detailed description of the derivation of both the one and two-sided Wilks
formulas from order statistics is given in Section A. An implementation of the generalized
Wilks function in the C++ language is given in Section A.3
The Wilks formulas representing one-sided and two-sided tolerance limits are ex-
pressed in Equations (2.1) and (2.2), respectively. ↵ denotes the proportion of the sam-
ple requested, while   denotes the level of conﬁdence. Sampling requirements of various18
statistical criteria are tabulated in Table 2.1.
1   ↵n    . (2.1)
n↵n 1   (n   1)↵n   1    . (2.2)
Table 2.1: Sampling requirements found using the one and two sided Wilks formulas
One-Sided Limit Two-Sided Limit
 /↵ 0.9 0.95 0.99 0.9 0.95 0.99
0.9 22 45 230 38 77 388
0.95 29 59 299 46 93 473
0.99 44 90 459 64 130 662
While the Wilks method is presented as a very understandable and widely-used
method, it has been determined that its use at the ﬁrst order leads to a conservative
result.[25] In this case, order represents the number of samples at the fringe of the sam-
ple set that are discarded. A "sample eﬀect" is said to arise due to the potential to
conservatively predict the upper 95% bounds when using all samples in a sample set.
Thus, the recent international, interdisciplinary BEMUSE program involving a LOCA
assessment under uncertainty using a wide array of TH codes found that using the Wilks
at the 4th or 5th order allowed for a more realistic assessment.[25][2][8] More so, sensi-
tivity analyses at this order were found to be more reliable due to the lack of spurious
correlations between input parameters found using smaller sample sets. Using the Wilks
method at these orders results in a requirement between 150-200 code runs for a single
response function, which may be considered cost prohibitive. It is thus enviable to build
upon the Wilks formula using Bayesian techniques, where the 95/95 criterion may be
justiﬁed using subjective probability while simultaneously lowering the cost in terms of
computation time. These methods are described further in Section 2.5.3.19
2.5.3 Binomial Bayesian Method
The resulting Wilks criterion summarized in the previous section and derived in Appendix
A rely on the very classical sampling theory which falls in the frequentist paradigm of
statistics. Presently, increased attention is given to Bayesian inferential results which
rely on the subjective notion of probability. The primary reason for this shift involves
gaining the ability to cast preconceived notions based on user expertise or lack thereof
through the use of the prior distribution. In this section, it is shown that coupling
subjective probability to the notion of one-sided computational failures with suﬃcient a
priori pessimism results in the classical one-sided Wilks formula. This method is known as
the Binomial Bayesian Method of sampling, and is the one used in this report to derive
sampling requirements as described in Section 6.4. Equation (2.3) below represents a
simplistic form of Bayes Theorem,
Pr(P|E)=
Pr(E|P)
Pr(E)
· Pr(P), (2.3)
where Pr(P|E) denotes the posterior distribution (a posteriori conﬁdence), Pr(E|P) de-
notes the aleatory variability of the data, and Pr(P) is the prior distribution. While
frequently removed from the formal deﬁnition, Pr(E) is simply a normalization factor
over the data, and is equal to
R
P Pr(E|P)Pr(P)dP when the aleatory distribution is
continuous.
If a user is interested in a simple pass/fail model of a safety assessment code, the
binomial distribution becomes the obvious choice covering aleatory variability, where the
criterion of failure will be set by the user in the cumulative distribution function. The
Binomial distribution is given as,
Pr(E|P)=
N!
n!(N   n)!
Pn(1   P)N n, (2.4)
where N represents the total number of code runs, and n is the number of those runs
considered successful. Once variability data has been acquired, the user is then faced
with the issue of placing a priori conﬁdence on the probability. Often times, a basic
uniform distribution is applied to all probability space, allowing the incoming data to20
single-handedly modify the inferred conﬁdence. However, some argue this is not suﬃ-
ciently pessimistic.[49] The reason for this is due to the extreme degree of complexity
involved in typical closed system thermal-hydraulic simulations. Thus, the "pessimistic
distribution" is advocated in scenarios such as assessing code failures from an inexperi-
enced standpoint.[50] This distribution is shown below,
Pr(P)=✏P✏ 1, (2.5)
where ✏< <1. Plugging in the binomial aleatory model and pessimistic prior distribution
into Equation (2.3),
Pr(P|E)=
 N
n
 
Pn(1   P)N n
R 1
0
 N
n
 
Pn(1   P)N n · ✏P✏ 1 · ✏P✏ 1
=
N!
(n   1)!(N   n)!
Pn 1(1   P)N n. (2.6)
Aligning Equation (2.6) with the ﬁrst-order criterion placed on the order statistics method
in Section A.1, the condition is that no code failures occur in N code runs. In doing so,
n = N and,
Pr(P|E)=nPn 1. (2.7)
In order to achieve a condition to which a scalar conﬁdence value may be assigned,
Equation (2.7) is integrated to achieve a posterior conﬁdence cumulative distribution
function (CDF) shown below,
CDF(P|E)=
Z P
 1
(nPn 1)dP = Pn. (2.8)
Finally, one is typically interested in placing conﬁdence on probabilities greater than
some cutoﬀ value, such as the 95% probability criterion of nuclear TH safety assessment.
Thus, assuming a minimum probability to be ↵, a scalar conﬁdence is placed on the case
that the probability is at least ↵. This is equivalent to equating the conﬁdence to the
cumulative probability space above ↵ shown in Equation (2.9),
  =1  CDF(↵|E)=1  ↵n. (2.9)21
In words, Equation (2.9) determines the n number of runs so that there is a 95% proba-
bility that at least 95% of the cases meet the safety margins. This of course is identical
to the condition found using classical sampling theory in Section A.1. As such, it can
be said that the interval sampling theory itself is pessimistic in nature, adding a slight
degree of conservatism to the sampling requirement. It is worth noting that when apply-
ing a uniform value of 1 as the prior, an example of a non-informative prior, the 95/95
criterion results in one less sampling requirement n when assuming the number of code
failures m is exactly zero (58 as opposed to the 59 garnered from Equation (2.9)).
2.6 Code Scaling Capabilities
The beneﬁts involved in the construction and use of dedicated scaled test facilities for
thermal-hydraulic transient testing have long been realized. The costs involved in sub-
jecting 1:1 scale power plants to tests are insurmountable due to required downtime from
power production and capital costs.
This inherent need for scaling has spurred the development of many scaling techniques
which seek to optimize or maintain certain parameters of greatest interest. Furthermore,
proper validation of scaled facility tests require scaling of the thermal-hydraulic frozen
code of choice. Regardless of the chosen scaling methodology, distortions in both tran-
sient and steady-state qualities will arise which do not allow for IET data to be directly
applied to NPP’s. To ﬁll this void, the TPG has documented the necessary steps within
CSAU to systematically and accurately assess the bias produced from scale distortion in
the uncertainty of an important parameter.[40] Previous to the development of CSAU,
conservative bounding calculations were used to predict risk in the wake of limited data.
Lastly, the use of well documented frozen codes is necessary to simulate the plant recov-
ery process, which typically may not be analyzed following IET’s.
Three factors exists as to why TH codes exhibit scaling deﬁciencies. First, while the
discretization schemes are traceable to ﬁrst principle formulas with inherent scalability,
the conservation equations are volume averaged and typically coupled to empirical rela-
tions. This aﬀects the accuracy of the closure relations and both the initial and boundary
conditions. Second, the granularity of the discretization likely diﬀers between the scaled22
and 1:1 facility, possibly leading to changes in the development of transient phenomenon
during a test. The ﬁnal factor materializes during the validation and veriﬁcation (V&V)
process, where the tuning of parameters to experimental data from an IET can lead to
compensation errors when brought to full scale.
A ten-step process makes up the scale distortion quantiﬁcation step 10 within CSAU
as depicted in Figure 2.1. In short, the scalability of the code is determined by studying
the empirically determined closure relations that model the process. Such information is
typically found in the Model and Correlations Quality Evaluation (MC/QE) document
bundled with the frozen code binary. The capability of the closure relations is dependent
on two factors inherent in the testing. First, the facility design and operation is studied
to determine whether established initial or boundary conditions are contributing to dis-
tortion. Also, the data matrix describing the variation of pivotal parameters should cover
the range of values expected in an NPP. Ultimately, once the MC/QE documents and
facility distortions have been reviewed, the characteristic phases of the transient directly
aﬀected by the distortion should be determined so biases may be quantiﬁed in the CSAU
procedure.
The TPG describe ten steps according to CSAU needed to evaluate scale-up capabil-
ities of codes.[40] A ﬂow chart pictorially describing the process is shown in Figure 2.3
The process begins by specifying the particular test facility, most likely taken care of in
previous CSAU steps. Documentation of both the facility and test results is required to
be provided in Step 2 so that similarity criteria may be established for parameters ex-
pected to be preserved between the IET and NPP. This also allows for known distortions
in design or initial/boundary conditions to be documented for future reference. Step 3
determines the eﬀects of scale by separating the well-scaled and distorted components,
determining the eﬀect/severity of distorted components, initial, and boundary conditions,
and separating well-simulated phases of the transient from those aﬀected by distortion.
The remaining steps 4-10 involve the attribution of quantiﬁed biases to parameters
acquired largely through expert opinion and literature. An over-arching bias for PIRT pa-
rameters aﬀected by scale must be established and justiﬁed in Step 4. Steps 5&6 account
for the establishment of bias due to a constrained test/sampling matrix, if determined23
to exist. Steps 7&8 require a bias to be constructed if insuﬃciencies are found to exist
in the scale-up capability of the closure relations used by the TH code. Lastly, the ﬁnal
steps require assessment of the data used to derive the closure relations. Speciﬁcally, one
is interested in whether data indicative of nominal NPP operation was used to establish
the empirical formulas. If not, a bias must be developed and justiﬁed.
Figure 2.3: The ten-step CSAU process for determining biases attributed to scaling
distortion and deﬁciencies.
A brief description of an application of CSAU to scaling deﬁciencies in a PWR expe-
riencing an LB-LOCA is given by the TPG. [6] [38] After separation of the transient into
three characteristic phases (Blowdown, Reﬁll, and Reﬂood) it was determined that the
blow-down phase exhibited full scalability using the TRAC-PF1 Mod 1 code. The reﬁll
and reﬂood phases were found to exhibit scaling deﬁciencies due to distortions in the
down-comer and plena resulting from the use of Power-to-Volume scaling methods. This24
very commonly used scaling methodology is a top-down approach where ﬂuid volumes
are scaled proportional to the change in power from the scaled facility to the NPP of
interest. Volumetric heat generation/removal rates, time scales, ﬂuid mass/energy dis-
tributions, velocities, accelerations, lengths, and heights are all preserved, leading to a
distortion of ECCS bypass capabilities. It was found that both ECCS bypass ﬂow, dis-
solved nitrogen content, and steam binding occurring in the steam generator were either
incorrectly scaled or left with uncertainty, and biases were developed to account for these
distortions. A more descriptive explanation of the uncertainties and biases accrued by
the TPG in their study of a 4-loop Westinghouse LB-LOCA is given in Section 2.7.1.
The application of such biases to the analyses described in this report is described fully
in Chapter 5.
2.7 Applications of CSAU to LWR Transients
2.7.1 Technical Program Group CSAU Proof-of-Concept Analysis
In the series of ﬁve papers following the CSAU overview, the TPG analyzed a 4-loop
Westinghouse 17x17 assembly NPP using the TRAC-PF1/Mod 1 code frozen at version
14.3.[6] For the sake of brevity, a description of the methodology developed and applied
to the ﬁrst UQ analysis is given here. A holistic summary of the CSAU method is given
in Section 2.2. Due to limitations in statistical knowledge, the subjective probability
(conﬁdence) was not treated in this analysis, and only the upper 95th percentile of the
CDF was used to denote the upper bound of a response function. As such, the uncer-
tainty of the code was considered to be the diﬀerence between the 95% value and the
mean. To assess the time-dependency issue, the LB-LOCA transient was separated into
three isolated stages consisting of a blow-down, and early/late reﬂood stages.[38] Due to
both code limitations and regulatory requirements, the only response function chosen for
assessment was the peak cladding temperature in the hot channel.[9]
As a result of the PIRT process documented by Wilson et. al. and Wulﬀ et. al[53][54],
it was determined that the primary contributors to uncertainty in a Westinghouse PWR
LB-LOCA are, in order of signiﬁcance, break ﬂow area, stored energy, fuel rod to ﬂuid
heat transfer, non-condensibles, pump 2-phase ﬂow, steam binding, and ECCS bypass25
capabilities. A consequence of the TRAC code, as well as many others, is that the afore-
mentioned contributors are typically the aggregation of empirical parameters or multiple
thermal-hydraulic quantities treatable by the code. An good example includes the stored
energy in the core, which is a function of gap conductance, power peaking, and con-
ductivity of the fuel. This fact primarily catalyzed the decision for a number of the
uncertainties such as those requiring knowledge of interfacial drag to be included as bi-
ases after the initial UQ. The TPG remained highly critical in assigning distributions
to input parameters, as this largely determines the degree of uncertainty propagated in
a black box analysis. Nearly all parameters were assigned uniform distributions, as it
simply requires upper and lower bounds for probabilities to be assigned. In all cases,
assignment of the upper and lower bounds were made as a proportion of the nominal
value, and justiﬁcation for each bound were found in performing an extensive literature
review.[38] Phenomenon deemed primary uncertainty contributors, corresponding code
treatable values, and the input ranges are tabulated in Table 2.2 below. As to be ex-
pected, the cost of running more than 10-15 TRAC runs was considered by the TPG to
be prohibitively expensive. Fortunately, TRAC-PF1/MOD1 carries the ability to insert
supplementary rods with altered characteristics while maintaining the integral thermal
hydraulic eﬀects achieved during a full run. In order to remain conservative, contributors
associated with the TRAC TH loop such as pump ﬂow, break ﬂow, and Tmin were chosen
to increase the PCT while the fuel parameters were treated as supplementary variations
of these runs. In total, 8 major TRAC runs were made with each run undergoing 23
supplementary variations leading to 184 data points contained in the ﬁnal test matrix.
In this groundbreaking CSAU analysis, the TPG used the now antiquated response sur-
face method by ﬁtting a polynomial to the data. This regression analysis was performed
using the method of least squares. In this approach, the goal is to optimize the ﬁt by min-
imizing the number of code runs, polynomial order, and root mean square error, while
maximizing the coeﬃcient of determination. More modern analyses make use of non-
parametric techniques such as the Wilks method described Sections 2.5.2 and Appendix
A. While the detriments of using the RMS to denote quality of ﬁt were acknowledged by
the TPG, this measure was used as justiﬁcation for applying a best-quartic ﬁt with 68
terms to each code run. In doing so, the RMS accrued in ﬁtting the PCT data was re-
duced 60-90oF over the three stages compared to a basic linear ﬁt. As described in Section26
Table 2.2: Uncertainty Contributors with parameters treatable by TRAC and Input
Ranges
Uncertainty Contributer Treatable Parameters Upper/Lower Bounds
Break Flow RM –
Stored Energy Gap Conductance ± 80%
Peaking Factor ± 5.6%
Fuel Conductivity ± 10%
Surface Heat Transfer Heat Transfer Coeﬃcient -25%/+50%
Tmin -20oC/+100oC
Pump 2-phase Flow Head and torque Curves 0/+2Sp
Steam Binding Interfacial Drag In:
Pool, core, upper plenum, and
hot legs
Bias
ECCS Bypass Interfacial Drag In: Down-
comer
Bias
Non-condensibles Non-condensibles Bias
2.5.1, in order to gather statistical information from non-linear surfaces, a Monte Carlo
sampler is required to quickly draw a large number of histories using pseudo-random in-
put permutations. The TPG used the SLI code RAM-CAM to perform the Monte Carlo
analysis of the regression ﬁt. It was determined that the mean PCT for all three stages
was acceptably converged following a history of 50,000 samples. The software was then
used to acquire the PCT value at each stage where
R
f(x1,x 2,...,x N)  0.95, where
f(x) denotes the PCT probability distribution function (PDF) corresponding to a permu-
tation of input values. The blow-down phase returned the largest 95% value of 1,447oF
before taking biases into account.
Following the PDF developments, ﬁve phenomenon were taken into consideration
as possible biases as a result of limitations in the modeling capabilities of the TRAC-
PF1/Mod1 frozen code. The phenomenon and their calculated biases and/or beneﬁts
are listed in Table 2.3. The chief concern in the modeling of the Westinghouse PWR
core in TRAC was the lack of inclusion of a separately considered hot channel in favor
of using a hot rod. This decision was motivated by discussions presented in the relevant27
literature and the results of two additional runs which included a separate hot channel,
resulting in a small change in the mean and 95% PCT results. The change provided a bias
in the blow-down results, while bestowing a beneﬁt for both re-ﬂood stages at the 95th
percentile. A potential beneﬁt results from TRAC and other TH codes modeling heated
ﬂows from the outside rather than inside, as would be the case of ﬂow around a rod.
It has been assessed that transferring between the two involves multiplying the Dittus-
Boelter correlation by the pitch-to-diameter ratio. It has also been determined through
experimental validations that a 40% uncertainty exists in applying this factor. While the
TPG determined that a 35-50oF beneﬁt could be realized, lack of validation in the cor-
relation lead to the discarding of this beneﬁt. Next, the TPG determined that, contrary
to many complaints in the literature, TRAC’s implementation of the Forslund-Roshenow
correlation (used in laminar convective heat transfer) resulted in overly conservative re-
sults. Nevertheless, previous accounts in literature have shown that a multiplier of 0.26
applied to the Forslund-Roshenow correlation signiﬁcantly decreases the error against
experimental test data. It was decided that supplementary calculations would be com-
pleted with both nominal and factored correlations, and the bias would stand for the
diﬀerence between the two results. The ﬁnal three biases were accounted for after re-
Table 2.3: Factors considered as biases to the PCT analysis by the Technical Program
Group[38]
PCT (oF)
Bias Blowdown Early Reﬂood Late Reﬂood
Hot Channel:
  mean 63 25 -14
  95th percentile 45 -54 -157
Forslund-Rohsenow 47 84 160
Entrainment 0 -9 106
ECCS Bypass 0 -34 -34
Nitrogen 0 18 18
Summed Biases 110 84 236
viewing pertinent literature on the phenomena, due to the inability of the frozen code to
model them. Although quantities are expected to be small, the eﬀect of Nitrogen dilution28
in the core after accumulator injection was calculated to increase the PCT by delaying
condensation eﬀects by 3.7 seconds. Steam binding eﬀects in the form of interfacial drag
due to entertainment in the core and upper plenum during the reﬂood phases are known
to be incorrectly estimated in TRAC-PF1/MOD1. Using correlation modiﬁers developed
by Los Alamos National Laboratory applied to the core and upper plenum entrainment
correlations, biases were accumulated from supplementary runs restarted from the blow-
down phase using nominal conditions. Finally, the eﬀect of ECCS bypass geometry is
required to be attended to as per ECCS evaluation conditions of 10CFR50.46K.[9] The
TPG speciﬁcally analyzed the delay in core reﬁll and the rate of reﬁlling occurring in
the lower plenum. A bias in PCT was determined in comparing TRAC results to Upper
Plenum Test Facility (UPTF) test data under the guidelines developed for bypass bias
within NUREG/CR-5249.[23]
The six phenomenon and their associated biases are summarized in Table 2.3. Much
controversy exists surrounding the manner in which the biases are to be aggregated. This
is especially true in the case of the hot channel analysis, as the biases are statistical in
nature, and markedly varied depending where the PDF is sampled. Ultimately, the mean
values were chosen purely on conservative grounds, which is easier to justify from a reg-
ulatory perspective. The remaining biases were then simply added to the TRAC PDF
values after making the assumptions that each bias is statistically independent from one
another, and the bias is constant over the phase represented. The second assumption
is clearly fallacious. However, the TPG considers the assumption to be a reasonable
one since no statistical attributes were given to the input uncertainties apart from their
bounding values.
Following the addition of all biases included in Table 2.3 to the 95% TRAC results,
a PCT of 1,572oF was found for the LB-LOCA transient, far below the regulatory re-
quirement of 2,200oF. It has been stated that even this value is entirely too conservative
following comparisons with scaled facility data from LOFT, CCTF/SCTF, where results
were respectively 100oFa n d1 2 5 oF lower before the addition of biases. Comparison be-
tween the LOFT and TRAC data with and without bias addition is given below in Figure
2.4. The TPG argue the bias addition is nonetheless warranted, since a false peak is pre-
dicted in the early reﬂood state where no transients are witnessed in experimental data.29
Only the late reﬂood peak is represented in experimental data. Overall, the TRAC re-
sults are conservative without the addition of biases. However, the prediction of transient
conditions at the start of early reﬂood may lend credence to their inclusion.[38]
Figure 2.4: Comparison between LOFT experimental PCT histogram and TRAC PCT
PDF results with and without bias.[38]30
2.7.2 Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis of LSTF 10% Hot-leg Break
An all-inclusive, novel approach to code qualiﬁcation and uncertainty analysis was re-
cently undertaken at the Large Scale Test Facility (LSTF) in Japan. This research
lead by Sengupta et. al. from the Bhabha Atomic Research Center of Mumbai, India
sought to qualify a RELAP5 Mod 3.2 model of the LSTF experiencing a 10% hot leg
break LOCA.[46] Following the qualiﬁcation, a mixture of safety margin quantiﬁcation
methodologies were applied to undertake an uncertainty and importance study, including
both CSAU and UMAE methods. The LSTF is a 1:48 volume scaled, full-height, 4-loop
Westinghouse PWR with a nominal power of 10MW.
Following the development of a nodalization scheme characterizing the LSTF within
RELAP5, systematic qualiﬁcation was undertaken for both the steady state and transient
cases of the nominal code runs. An acceptable error band of 10% between nominal code
and experiment cases was established as per requirements outlined in the UMAE.[20]
Sengupta et. al. dictate two steps required for proper steady state qualiﬁcation, and
ﬁve steps necessary for transient qualiﬁcation. Following the gathering of IET and RE-
LAP steady state data, errors were determined between the geometric parameters of the
nodalization scheme such as volume, elevation, and heat transfer area. Finally, errors
were determined between initial and boundary conditions including core power, pressur-
izer heater power, pump velocity, pressure settings, etc. It was found that all of these
parameters derived from RELAP5 were within 10% of the experimental values. As such,
the steady state case was considered qualiﬁed.
Sengupta et. al. cite the major diﬀerence in transient qualiﬁcation being the use
of expert observation versus strict quantiﬁed comparison. This is primarily due to the
development of phenomenological windows, where unique, relevant physical processes
are expected to occur in certain time spans. Thus, the ﬁrst step taken was to verify the
matching of the computational time sequences of signiﬁcant events with the experimental
case. Sengupta et. al. cite good agreement between most of the timings of signiﬁcant
events. Second, a CSNI phenomenon validation matrix, or series of parameters pivotal
to the particular test, was developed to enable data matching through calibration of
code parameters. The comparison of phenomenological windows such as blowdown and31
reﬂood phases were then compared and found to be in good agreement. Lastly, thermal
hydraulic aspects such as integral and single value parameters were identiﬁed and tracked
in RELAP. The time trends of these parameters are then compared visually for signiﬁcant
irregularities. None were found, and thus the restart case was then qualiﬁed for uncer-
tainty analysis. Most of the parameters during the transient exhibited time-dependent
behavior reﬂective of the LSTF experiment. However, Sengupta et. al. determined that
RELAP5 Mod 3.2 wields deﬁciencies when predicting the eﬀects of rapid steam conden-
sation, two-phase and single phase vapor ﬂow, and heat transfer and/or loop ﬂow rate
during accumulator injections.
A traditional PIRT process was applied when determining the uncertain input param-
eters and safety-related output responses. The number of perturbed input parameters
was brought to a manageable level by performing a screening sensitivity analysis at the
outset. One such example of this was given by determining the weight of a myriad of
parameters on overall break ﬂow by perturbing each individually. Graphical veriﬁcation
of the eﬀect is acceptable at this preliminary stage in the analysis. As opposed to apply-
ing a more traditional Wilks formulation or Bayesian approach to uncertainty sampling,
a rank formulation was used to determine the upper and lower percentiles. The number
of code runs was selected based on expert opinion after reviewing pertinent literature
covering Latin Hypercube Sampling, which stipulates a minimum sampling of 4/3 times
the number of input variables. The authors cite modern analyses that call for a more con-
servative 2k to 5k number of code runs, where k represents the number of input variables.
Owing to the ten input parameters prescribed for perturbation in this test, Sengupta et.
al. determined 50 code runs would be performed. Sixteen output parameters were chosen
to be monitored for uncertainty quantiﬁcation. While the method utilized failed to ac-
count for conﬁdence, it is worth noting that a Bayesian or Wilks approach, which rely on
the number of response functions, would require nearly 500 code runs when monitoring
sixteen response functions.
After extracting the lower and upper bounds for each output parameter from the
uncertainty analysis, the nominal and experimental time trends were then compared. As
previously mentioned, the RELAP5 model exhibited diﬃculty in predicting the time of
accumulator injection during the transient due to a lower-than-expected calculated loop32
pressure during the single phase vapor portion of the blow-down. The experimental time
of injection was not included in the uncertainty bounds of the RELAP prediction, thus
causing the model to miss the expected spike in PCT during brief core uncovery witnessed
in the LSTF experiment. The opposite issue occurred during the second accumulator in-
jection, where the RELAP model failed to predict a rapid decrease in primary pressure
due to steam condensation occurring in the reﬂood phase. The experimental accumulator
injection rate again fell far outside of the uncertainty bounds of the smaller, more diﬀuse
rate witnessed in the RELAP model. Nevertheless, the remaining response parameters
including pressurizer pressure, steam generator dome pressure, break ﬂow, collapsed liq-
uid levels, and ﬂuid temperatures witnessed experimental values lying within uncertainty
bounds for the duration of the transient.
Sensitivity analysis, referred to Sengupta et. al. as an importance study, was carried
out by assuming a linear regression model between the input and response parameters.
Standardized regression coeﬃcients (SRC’s) are evaluated as the sensitivity coeﬃcients,
where the absolute value determines the importance of the input parameter’s eﬀect and
the sign denotes the direction of that eﬀect (directly/inversely proportional). The linear
regression is given in the form of Equation (2.10), and the degree of ﬁt, or coeﬃcient of
determination, is given by Equation (2.11),
ˆ y = bo +
nX X
j=1
bjxj, (2.10)
R2 =
PnS
i=1
 
ˆ yi   ¯ y
 2
PnS
i=1
 
yi   ¯ y
 2, (2.11)
where nS = number of code runs, nX = number of input variables, and yi denotes an
output variable. In applying this approach, Sengupta et. al. found the break discharge co-
eﬃcient to have the greatest absolute eﬀect on safety related response parameters. Apart
from this, it was found that the steam generator relief pressure wielded the greatest inﬂu-
ence on secondary pressure at 300 seconds, while accumulator pressure and temperature
both played a signiﬁcant inverse role on loop pressure distribution and ﬂow rate at 400
seconds into the transient. Using Equation (2.11), Sengupta et. al. acquired coeﬃcients33
of determination close to 1 for all monitored response functions, denoting the linear re-
gression assumption to be a decent one. In conclusion, at no point in the experiment was
a safety-related parameter witnessed to breach the limiting conditions of operation, and
the RELAP5 model of the LSTF was found to accurately predict the evolution of events
in a Hot-leg LOCA.34
Chapter 3: Oregon State University Advanced Plant Experiment
3.1 Overview of APEX Design and Implementation
3.1.1 Introduction and Scaling
The Advanced Plant Experiment (APEX) facility at Oregon State University (OSU) is
a thermal-hydraulic integral system test facility, for the assessment of the passive safety
system performance of the Westinghouse AP600/AP1000 advanced passive nuclear reac-
tors. Thus far, the OSU APEX facility is the best representation of the AP1000 reactor,
and is the only facility capable of assessing its long term cooling capabilities. APEX is
a one-fourth height, one-half time scale, reduced pressure facility operating at 400 psia
(2.76MPa). Scaling of the facility was achieved by developing a plausible phenomenon
and identiﬁcation ranking table (PPIRT) to assess the phenomenon important to passive
safety system performance, including thermal-hydraulic aspects that alter core inventory
or PCT during design basis transients. Highly-aﬀected or plausible aspects resulting
from the PIRT were then given special attention with the goal of maintaining ﬁdelity
during the scaling process. Ultimately, the Hierarchical, Two-tiered Scaling methodology
(H2TS) developed under USNRC guidelines was adopted in order to provide a thorough,
traceable, and auditable approach to properly scale APEX for design, construction, and
eventual code validation.[45]
Core heating capabilities are granted via a 48-rod bundle of resistance heaters with
a thermal output of 1000kW. The facility features two hot legs (HL) and four cold legs
(CL) with each loop coupled to a steam generator (SG) wielding 133 U-tubes. Each
cold leg maintains a dedicated reactor coolant pump. The passive systems inherent in
the AP1000/APEX design include a 4-stage Automatic Depressurization system (ADS)
, two core makeup tanks (CMT) , two accumulators (ACC) , a passive residual heat
removal heat exchanger (PRHR HX) , and an in-containment refueling water storage
tank (IRWST) . Plant balance is maintained through the use of a chemical volume control35
system (CVS), feedwater, and an active residual heat removal system. A 3-D graphical
depiction of the APEX facility and signiﬁcant ﬂow lines is shown below in Figure 3.1.[36]
Figure 3.1: APEX Facility Layout
3.1.2 Instrumentation and Component Descriptions
All major components including piping and storage tanks are constructed of stainless
steel and are well insulated. The reactor vessel models the prototypical AP1000 vessel
including a downcomer region and direct vessel injection (DVI) . The pressurizer is con-
nected to the HL-2 loop through a spiral surge line, and contains heater rods used to
maintain pressure in the reactor coolant system (RCS). While not depicted in Figure 3.136
above, a larger diameter is used at the top of the pressurizer dome to account for the
lack of vertical space in the APEX facility. Unlike the AP1000 design, steam venting
through a power operated relief valve (PORV) is used to reduce RCS pressure as opposed
to applying condensing spray.
The two steam generators used in APEX are made to represent Westinghouse Delta-
75 SG’s, and are equipped with PORV’s to vent steam to an exhaust on the secondary
side. Exhaust from the steam generators is lead through either an instrumented turbine
simulation path or a specialized path used for facility start-up. Ultimately, unused steam
is released to the environment. Four variable speed reactor coolant pumps (RCP) made
to simulate the Westinghouse canned motor pumps maintain a nominal ﬂow rate of 320
gal/min in the RCS. Each pump is connected to a single cold leg, and is programmable
to simulate RCP coast-down.
Break spool pieces are installed in varied locations throughout the primary system
to simulate top, bottom, single, and double-ended breaks in the hot and cold legs, core
makeup tanks, and direct vessel injection system. Oriﬁce plates are used to maintain a
speciﬁc break size. APEX has fully implemented the four-stage automatic depressuriza-
tion system which enables the succession of phenomenological windows that occur during
depressurization following a scram (S signal) at full power. ADS valves one through three
are located on top the pressurizer, capturing steam bled through the PORV. The ADS-1
valve is actuated on an S-signal to initiate the blow-down phase. ADS 2&3 follow ac-
cording to predetermined time delays. Downstream from the valves, liquid and vapor
are separated, analyzed, and then recombined for dumping in to the IRWST through a
specialized sparger. The fourth ADS valve is connected to both hot legs with the primary
containment sump located downstream. ADS4 on the PZR size provides a tee connection
to the PRHR HX, as shown in Figure 3.1.
The IRWST is constructed to hold 392.5 ft3 of liquid volume. The APEX IWRST
maintains connections with the ADS 1-3 sparger, DVI system, the primary sump contain-
ment, and PRHR connections. Tank isolation valves are opened on a low pressure signal
(< 37 psig). Passive residual heat removal begins at the ADS4 tee, passing through the
heat exchanger located within the IRWST, and culminates at the SG2 cold leg channel37
head. PRHR ﬂow is activated upon either an S-signal or ADS-1 valve actuation. Two
CMT’s are installed in APEX both exhibiting 13.17 ft3 of liquid volume. The release of
water is actuated on an S-signal plus 5.6 seconds in all transient cases excluding station
blackout tests. Resistance in ﬂow lines is maintained to AP1000 speciﬁcations through
the introduction of oriﬁce plates. Two accumulators are present each holding 9 ft3 of
water and 1.5 ft3 of N2 gas. APEX accumulators actuate when loop pressure falls below
ACC pressure (190psig), and forcefully inject water into the DVI system.
APEX primary containment sumps (not pictured) account for 405 ft3 of liquid holding
volume, and maintain connections with the ADS4 separators, secondary sump, break ﬂow
separators, DVI systems, and steam exhaust header. This sump collects all liquid ﬂow
from modeled breaks and ADS4 valves. Two re-circulation lines provide ﬂow to DVI
lines, and this path is actuated upon decreasing IRWST level. Finally, one signiﬁcant
feature not feasible for scaling is the AP1000 condensation dome. In the Westinghouse
implementation, a condensation dome acts to condense released steam in the containment
via convection of environmental air circulating through the dome walls. To compensate
for the loss of ﬂuid due to lack of containment condensation, a containment condensate
return system has been implemented in APEX to inject ﬂuid directly to the IRWST or
sump at the same ﬂow rate as the vented steam.[36] A more detailed description of the
APEX test facility can be found in NUREG-1826. [35]38
Chapter 4: Feed and Bleed Cooling of Pressurized Water Reactors
The crux of the eﬀort described in this report concerns the analysis of a PWR (APEX) ex-
periencing a thermal hydraulic transient known as a loss-of-feedwater accident (LOFW).
A moderately well-established method for handling such transients is the feed-and-bleed
(F&B) . It is the goal of this research eﬀort to understand the responsiveness of the APEX
facility to this method in its passive form. Established, rudimentary theory concerning
the F&B process is described below in Section 4.1 while the APEX-speciﬁc implementa-
tion is described in Section 4.2.1.
4.1 Theory of Feed and Bleed Method
The application of feed-and-bleed processes to theoretical LOFW accidents gained notable
traction following the accident at Three-Mile Island TMI-2 accident on March 28, 1978. In
this case, the PORV received much attention due to the loss of RCS inventory attributed
to its failure to close.[41] In most postulated LOFW accidents, the idea is to properly
respond to the complete loss of a secondary heat sink at full core power. Thus, the
ﬂuid ﬂow inside of the steam generators can be assumed to be perfectly adiabatic. In
such a scenario, the operator must make use of primary injection systems to provide the
vessel with cool water while simultaneously maintaining or decreasing pressure in the
PCS via relief valves. The mathematical balance of the feed-and-bleed process is shown
in Equation (4.1),
˙ Qnet = ˙ Qcore +(˙ mh)PF   (˙ mh)RV , (4.1)
where:
˙ Qnet = Net energy balance of RCS
˙ Qcore = Heat addition from reactor core
mRV = Mass ﬂow rate out of pressurizer relief valve
mPF = Mass ﬂow rate of primary feed39
hRV = Enthalpy of outﬂow from pressurizer relief valve
hPF = Enthalpy of inﬂow from primary feed.
Therefore, the extraction of heated steam or ﬂuid must oﬀset the decay energy re-
moved from the fuel rods. This "bleed" system typically includes the pressurizer PORV
and/or safety relief valve (SRV) which are used to either maintain or slowly bleed pressure
and remove energy at a rate where safety of the PCS is maintained. The "feed" portion
of the F&B process includes a myriad of injection systems at the operator or modeler’s
discretion highly dependent on the context of the test or scenario. These systems typi-
cally involve the use of both safety grade charging pumps (high-pressure safety injection)
or non safety grade high-pressure injection systems (HPIS).
Proper application of a F&B technique seeks to maintain a quasi-steady state in RCS
pressure via the cycled actuation of the pressurizer PORV. Shimeck et. al. ﬁrst developed
the idea of operating maps for F&B applications as a preliminary analysis of the oper-
ating band for RCS pressure where quasi-steady state energy balance may occur.[15] An
example of a typical feed-and-bleed operation map is shown in Figure 4.1 The upper and
lower bounds placed on this pressure are described as estimates for maintaining a mass
balance and energy balance, respectively. As pressure is increased, mass balance is no
longer insured as the pressure head curve of the safety injection pump rapidly approaches
zero, a phenomenon known as dead head. Discharge through the PORV or SRV outstrips
the injection capacity of the pump, and mass inventory begins to decrease. Alternatively,
if RCS pressure is allowed to drop rapidly, an energy imbalance occurs due to the lack
of energy removal through the PORV. Shimeck et. al. demonstrate that while very high
or low quality ﬂows eﬀectively remove energy from the primary system, a strong mixture
of qualities results in an retardation of energy removal. Naturally, much of the eﬀort
involved in preliminary F&B analysis involves the estimation of proper pressure bands
and the methods used to maintain the operation within this band. A review of proper
literature has ﬁrmly suggested that pressure bounds are optimally maintained through
cycling of the PORV and throttling of the ﬂuid injection rate. The former method pro-
motes phase separation within the pressurizer vessel thereby allowing for prediction of
the saturated steam ﬂow.40
Figure 4.1: A typical operating map for optimal steady state feed-and-bleed operation
[15]
It has been suggested that PORV discharge is by far the most variable boundary con-
dition in the F&B process, and is the result of many parameters characteristic of both
the transient and facility design.[15] The most uncertain of these parameters is the ag-
gregation of two-phase ﬂow eﬀects. Other highly uncertain parameters typically include
PORV characteristics, HPSI injection rates, system heat losses, and ﬂuid losses. If at
any point the pressurizer is expected to have gone solid, depressurization will create a
high-quality volume in the dome owing to the assumption that pressurizer water is the
hottest in the PCS. This cycling of the PORV is a viable F&B technique that allows
high quality ﬂow even when low quality ﬂow exists in the PCS, eﬀectively reducing the
dependency of F&B on hot leg conditions. One design feature that plays an especially
important role in F&B actuation is the geometry of the pressurizer surge line. Generally,
surge lines are oriented in a manner so that ﬂow velocities are large enough to ensure
ﬂooding of the pressurizer, and therefore no return ﬂow. Therefore, in order to maintain
a high-quality discharge from a latched-open PORV, high quality steam must originate
from the hot leg. Shimeck et. al. realized a surge line with a horizontal orientation orig-41
inating from the side of a HL requires nearly 200% more voiding in the PCS relative to a
top-oriented line. This introduces a handicap in the successful operation of a F&B exper-
iment since a smaller safety margin exists between transient operation and core uncovery.
As previously alluded to, many parameters are left to the operator’s discretion when
evaluating the eﬀectiveness of a feed-and-bleed test. Most limiting of the event pathways
is the operation or latching of the pressurizer PORV. Latching may occur in the failed
open or failed closed positions. However, it is expected that if a stuck closed pathway is
simulated, a secondary energy removal mechanism exists in the form of an SRV operating
on a high pressure alarm signal. The providing of primary ﬂow from makeup feed pumps
or tanks is considered optional. However, all other safety injection and cooling systems are
considered to be isolated or removed in order to analyze the properties and eﬀectiveness of
the high-pressure injection source. Primary reactor coolant pumps are typically coasted
down upon receiving an S-signal in order to allow stratiﬁed ﬂow to develop in the PCS.
While one is free to analyze F&B eﬀectiveness at diﬀerent points in the decay process,
the core is always assumed to be tripped and is the only provider of RCS heat input. To
properly analyze the limiting LOFW case, steam generator auxiliary feeds are cut oﬀ,
and the transient may begin with either a liquid solid secondary or a more conservative
adiabatic assumption.[39]
4.2 APEX Feed and Bleed Implementation
4.2.1 Passive Feed and Bleed
The process of performing a feed-and-bleed operation in a passive LWR is quite similar
to methods used in traditional generation II reactors. In truth, when concerned with
only the primary system, feed-and-bleeds use natural circulation due to the obligatory
tripping of the reactor coolant pumps for proper stratiﬁcation to occur in the RCS. Dif-
ferences between F&B operations in generation III+ reactors include primary injection
points and PORV geometry and routing.
As described in Section 4.1, nearly all safety injection systems coupled to a reactor’s
primary cooling system remain isolated during a feed-and-bleed. Primary cooling water42
is transported into the RCS via the use of a safety or non-safety grade high-pressure
injection system. Assessment of the grade and head of the pump(s) used in this system
greatly determines the upper bound of the steady-state F&B operating pressure, thereby
determining if the primary system requires depressurization immediately following a re-
actor trip. Injection points for the HPSI have traditionally been located upstream of
the core downcomer orthogonal to a cold leg as part of the overall ECCS bypass piping.
The AP1000/APEX1000 facilities have replaced this system with core makeup tanks that
remain at RCS pressure at all times. The additional primary cooling water stored in the
CMT’s act as a segway to long term cooling while the system depressurizes. However,
CMT injection is not suitable for steady state F&B operation due to the eventual loss
of mass in the system at high pressures. As such, all the prototypical safety injection
systems in a passive feed and bleed remain isolated.
Fortunately, several of the primary injection systems characteristic of the AP1000
design were included in APEX, such as the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS)
and the Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS). The non-safety grade CVS pump
(CVSP) is a Goulds 3-stage centrifugal pump ideal for mid-pressure injection and quasi-
steady-state F&B operation. Under normal operation, the CVSP is used for mainte-
nance of ﬂuid conditions during start-up, AP1000 operations modeling, normal supply
of makeup water to RCS, hydro-static testing, and backup for the main feed pumps
(MFP).[36] The CVS is an optimal choice for F&B injection using APEX due to the con-
sistent ﬂow of water from the feed storage tank, pending proper operation of the CVSP.
Feedwater is made of chemically-controlled water delivered by municipal potable water
supplies after passing through the APEX water puriﬁcation system. Following charging
via the CVSP, makeup water passes though a series of check valves and a motor valve
to ensure directionality and volumetric ﬂow based upon primary conditions such as pres-
surizer pressure. Makeup water is then passed through a tee combining the PRHR and
CVS ﬂows and injected into the lower channel head of SG-2. A diagram depicting the
CVS injection point is given in Figure 4.2.
Following injection, cooler makeup ﬂow is then routed into the core via the cold legs and
downcomer. Feedwater supply to the secondary side of the steam generators has been
removed, thereby allowing supplies to void in both the primary and secondary systems43
Figure 4.2: Detail of CVS/PRHR HX ﬂow connnection to SG-2 lower channel head. [1]
due to the lack of heat removal from the RCS. In similar fashion to traditional PWR F&B
operations, excess vapor accumulating in the hot legs is bled through the top of the pres-
surizer. The prototypical PORV is replaced by the ADS1-3 system in the AP1000/APEX
design, granting the ability to rapidly depressurize the RCS in a controlled manner. Due
to the ADS-4 being located along the PRHR line, thereby bypassing the PZR entirely,
and the adequate mass/energy removal via ADS-1, this valve system is isolated during
an APEX F&B. An over-sized schedule 80 pipe leads is split equally from the top of the
pressurizer to a system of three valves (ADS1-3) in parallel. Valve tripping conditions
may be set against pre-deﬁned logic commensurate with the thermal-hydraulic test under
analysis, or may be manipulated manually. Fluid passed through the ADS1-3 valves is
separated phasically and quantiﬁed, and ﬁnally routed into the IRWST through a sparger.44
4.2.2 Quasi-Steady-state Operation of APEX Feed-and-Bleed
A preliminary analysis was performed to enable estimation of the proper operating pres-
sure for a quasi-steady-state F&B experiment using APEX. The estimation was achieved
in developing an operating map similar to the type described in Section 4.1 and Shimeck
et. al.[15]. Mass injection capability of the CVSP was determined using pump head
curves supplied in the Goulds Model 3333 CB5-45 documentation.[36] This report out-
lines the head in feet against a chosen ﬂow rate. A conversion from head to operating
pressure was made to translate the information to an operating map using Equation (4.2),
psi =0 .432781 ⇤
⇥
ft. Water(68oF)
⇤
. (4.2)
This particular relation is considered valid due to the maintaining of APEX feedwater
at 68.7o F. ADS1-3 mass ﬂow was extrapolated from separator measurements witnessed
in previous APEX facility tests at transient pressures. Linear interpolation was used
for pressures not clearly deﬁned or highly variable from test to test. Owing to the
fact that the pressurizer should remain highly voided and that vapor is responsible for
much of the energy removal in highly voided transients, an assumption was made that
100% of the ADS1-3 ﬂow consists of vapor. This is justiﬁable under the analysis by
Shimeck et. al. due to the top-orientation of the pressurizer surge line connection to
HL-2. The analysis predicts phase separation occurring almost immediately following
the ﬁrst signs of voiding, where in side-oriented regimes a 50% reduction in RCS liquid
level is required for proper stratiﬁcation and entrainment in the surge line.[15] Following
the determination of mass removal rates through the ADS, energy removal rates were
subsequently found using the traditional energy ﬂow relation given in Equation (4.3),
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where m represents the mass, v denotes velocity, and h denotes speciﬁc enthalpy. The
eﬀect of height diﬀerences between the CVSP and SG-2 lower channel head is assumed
to be negligible. The mass ﬂow rate is found by multiplying the density (inverse speciﬁc
volume) by the volumetric ﬂow rate, a measurable quantity of the break separator. Linear
interpolation is used for steam table quantities at deﬁned pressure setpoints. For both
the energy and mass ﬂows through the ADS, only ADS-1 was considered, since it was45
estimated that it alone should enable adequate heat removal while retaining mass and
pressure in the system. Finally, energy added to the system is assumed a constant 0.9
MW. Power characteristic of the moment of SCRAM is known to be 0.925 MW, decaying
according to Equation (4.4)[39],
P =
610
[1 + 0.02338t]0.2316. (4.4)
Accordingly, power will decrease below 0.9 MW in under one second, leaving a consistent
assumption of 0.9MW energy input to be a conservative one. Combining these four func-
tions (mass and energy input/output) into one plot with their respective axes, an APEX
feed-and-bleed operating map is produced as shown below in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Upper and lower operating pressure bounds for a quasi-steady-state APEX
feed-and-bleed.
As depicted, a quasi-steady-state operation of a feed-and-bleed using the APEX facility46
has a particularly wide range of operating pressures. It would appear justiﬁable to allow
the RCS to operate between 1000 kPa and 2500 kPa (145-362 psig). However, much uncer-
tainty exists in the functions shown due to assumptions likely to prove inadequate. Such
factors include ﬂow loss due to piping and valves in the CVS system, three-dimensional
mixing eﬀects in the SG-2 lower channel head, and excessive two-phase ﬂow exiting from
the pressurizer. These factors would act to drive the ADS energy removal curve down-
ward and the CVSP injection leftward, leaving an optimal pressure band to likely fall
between 1500-2250 kPa. With the CVSP and CVS valve operation logic hard-coded into
system operation, maintaining the operating pressure must be achieved via the isolation
of ADS2-3 and the re-writing of set-points for ADS-1 actuation. The manipulation of
virtual APEX operation in the RELAP5 Mod 3.3 code is described in detail in Section
6.1.47
Chapter 5: Phenomenon Identiﬁcation and Ranking Process
The Nuclear Energy Agency Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI)
observe three methods in which an analyst may undergo development of input uncer-
tainties. The ﬁrst and most typical method is to make full use of the available literature
concerning ranges and distributions derived from experimental and code analyses, making
justiﬁed alterations pertaining to the particular type and scale of the ITF under anal-
ysis. Another method is to ﬁt nominal simulation data directly to IET and SET data,
and develop uncertainties from the errors. As a last resort, if limited applicable data
is available to the analyst, expert elicitation should be used, supplying non-conservative
assumptions with expansive justiﬁcation.[25]
Determination of the phenomena expected to most signiﬁcantly aﬀect the response
function and its uncertainty were determined using a PIRT catalyzed via an extensive
review of pertinent literature. This literature spanned topics of uncertainty propagation
applied to IET’s and speciﬁc feed-and-bleed analyses.[2][15][32][46][6][39] A guideline for
aiding in the PIRT process was the oﬃcial Westinghouse PIRT developed for a feed-line
break aﬄicting an AP1000, in which case a signiﬁcant fraction of secondary coolant ﬂow
to the steam generators is lost. The Westinghouse PIRT is summarized in Table 5.1
below, where H, M, and L remain the traditional high, medium, and low rankings, re-
spectively. This PIRT is cited by Westinghouse to be very similar to traditional PWR
non-LOCA PIRTs when using the CMTs.[14] However, the Westinghouse PIRT is in-
suﬃcient in many ways. This is primarily due to the expected depressurization and
re-circulation using the respective ADS’s and CMT’s. As previously described in Section
4.1, a proper feed-and-bleed isolates all injection systems apart from the high-pressure
forced injection system. Furthermore, all ADS valves are isolated apart from a single
valve which is oscillated to maintain a quasi-steady state feed-and-bleed. Thus, ratings
applied to the ACC, CMT, and PRHR properties become meaningless. To the contrary,
the ADS ﬂow, energy removal, and set points become increasingly signiﬁcant when at-
tempting to perform a successful feed-and-bleed. In review of pertinent literature, it was48
Table 5.1: PIRT for AP1000 feedline-break Design-Basis Analysis[14]
Component and System Phenomena Ranking
Critical Flow H
Vessel: Mixing M
Vessel: Flashing in Upper Head L
Core: Reactivity Feedback M
Core: Reactor Trip H
Core: Decay Heat H
Core: Forced Convection H
Core: Natural Circulation Flow and Heat Transfer H
RCP Coastdown Performance L
Pressurizer: Fluid Level L
Pressurizer: Surge-line Pressure Drop L
SG Heat Transfer H
Secondary Initial Conditions M
RCS Wall Stored Heat L
CMT: Recirculation Injection M
CMT: Gravity-drain Injection M
CMT: Vapor Condensation Rate M
CMT: Balance Line Pressure Drop M
CMT: Balance Line Initial Temperature Distribution M
ACC Injection Flow Rate N/A
PRHR: Flow Rate and Heat Transfer H
IRWST Initial Temperature M
ADS N/A
determined that the feed-and-bleed process wields a possibility of three phenomenological
windows: blowdown, saturation, and quasi-steady-state. The blow-down phase resembles
the depressurization occurring in a traditional forced-circulation PWR. As such, much
of the important phenomena described in literature pertaining to traditional PWR SB
and LB-LOCAs remains relevant to a passive feed-and-bleed. The saturation stage is an
optional stage, and it occurs when the hot-leg becomes entirely voided due to a delay
in high-pressure feedwater injection. This delay can be the result of automatic system
failure or human error, and contains a great deal of uncertainty. Finally, the quasi-steady-49
state phase begins after full actuation of the HPSI. Assuming no failures relating to HPSI
operation occur, it is expected that reaching this phase will translate to successful core
decay heat removal for the long term. The revitalized PIRT applicable to a passive feed-
and-bleed developed using Table 5.1, literature, and previous test data is given below in
Table 5.2. Short descriptions conveying the motivation for a particular phenomenon’s
inclusion are given below. Ultimate sampling distributions associated with input deck
parameters as a result of the PIRT are summarized in Table 5.3 Complete independence
has been assumed between all uncertain input parameters, as this is typically considered
a valid assumption for IETs.[8]
5.1 OSU APEX1000 Feed-and-bleed PIRT
5.1.1 Primary Coolant Parameters
The ﬁrst phenomena assessed for the FB PIRT included those associated with primary
ﬂuid conditions in the core and RCS during the transient. Chieﬂy, the development of
critical ﬂow is considered signiﬁcant due to the need for high-quality bleeding needed
from the pressurizer. The phenomenon known as critical ﬂow is sub-divided into many
observable parameters such as the timing of RCS saturation, the degree of stratiﬁca-
tion, and the subsequent entertainment of saturated liquid at important junctions such
as the pressurizer surge-line connection.[15] Timing of core saturation is important for
optimal HPSI actuation, another parameter/phenomenon deemed signiﬁcant. The level
of stratiﬁcation/entrainment observed in the hot-legs aﬀect PZR conditions which in turn
dictates the quality of ﬂuid expelled through the ADS valve. As described by Shimeck
et. al., the energy removal rate from a PORV is highly reliant on ﬂuid properties in the
PZR dome.[15] While it has been known that many TH FV codes exhibit diﬃculty in
correctly predicting entrainment in IET simulations, the eﬀect of this on PWR blow-
down development has been found to be entirely negligible. [6][54][38] Thus, it was not
accounted for in this analysis. Furthermore, the simple act of vertically orienting the
PZR surge line from the hot-leg allows for the inter facial height following stratiﬁcation
to become insigniﬁcant.[15] The remaining importance in RCS critical ﬂow is focused on
the initial development of saturated steam. This is only achieved by controlled operation50
of the ADS relief valve and delayed actuation of the HPSI.
Literature describing LOCA simulation has long decried the use of the Forslund-
Roshenow heat transfer correlation in annular ﬂows with dispersed droplet ﬁelds due
to its optimism when compared to separate eﬀects rod bundle data.[54][38][27] To this
day, RELAP5 Mod 3.3 continues in its use of the F-R correlation by comparison to the
Bromley correlation and taking the maximum of the two.[30][18] The TPG used the sug-
gestions by Shumway et. al. to vary a PWR blow-down simulation and determined that
the F-R correlation lead to a 47oF bias of PCT at both the mean and the 95th percentile.
However, it has been determined that the RELAP5 nodalization of APEX consistently
returns conservative values compared to IET blowdown data on the order of 50oF. [37]
With this in mind, the addition of the F-R correlation bias advocated by the TPG was
not implemented in the passive feed-and-bleed analysis.
As one would expect, a special degree of attention is focused on determining ﬂuid
properties inside the reactor vessel. Westinghouse originally separated this problem
into two separate phenomena: vessel mixing (radial homogeneity) and upper plenum
voiding.[14] Thermal mixing of coolant in the downcomer and core was elevated from
medium to high due to a subtle vibration issue inherent in SG-2 operation witnessed
during the OSU AP1000-13 test involving a PRHR actuation at diﬀerent levels of steady-
state operation.[33] Owing to the fact that the CVSP is used as the prototypical HPSI in
the passive F&B, it is worth noting the injection line to the SG-2 lower channel head is
shared with the PRHR HX line (see Figure 4.2). It was found that forced convection oc-
curring in the SG’s lead to an oscillation of the ﬂow path of cooler PRHR water between
cold legs 2 and 4. Further analysis using three-dimensional modeling software to force
this phenomenon to occur demonstrated an uneven mixing in the core. It was found
that cooler water would rotate counter-clockwise in the downcomer leaving relatively
warmer and colder halves in the core’s lower grid plate. Visualization of this phenomena
is depicted in Figure 5.1. This issue is quite similar to the issue described in the CSAU
proof-of-concept report (see Section 2.7.1) where the uneven mixing due to orthogonal
ECCS bypass injection was analyzed under uncertainty. It was found that the lack of
explicit hot-leg modeling lead to a 45oFm i x i n gb i a s( 6 3 oF at the mean) during the blow-
down stage. This uncertainty was therefore applied to the passive feed-and-bleed analysis51
due to lack of additional information, such as the degree of forced convection that would
be occurring due to CVSP injection during RCP coast down.
CVS
Figure 5.1: Stratiﬁed Flow in Downcomer
5.1.2 Core Heater Rod Parameters
Much of the input parameter uncertainty lies in the correlations and initial conditions
describing core phenomena. This is naturally due to the fact that the core typically
acts as the primary heat source in a shutdown transient. Due to the inoperability of
PZR heaters in a F&B process, the core is in fact the only major contributor to heat
addition in the primary ﬂuid. By and large the most important parameter aﬀecting re-
sponse functions like PCT or primary pressure is the power decay curve characteristic
of the facility. Considering the rods in ITFs are nearly always non-nuclear, the curves
are typically known to a high degree of accuracy. Nevertheless, a common practice in
scaling ITF data to full-scale under uncertainty is to apply a 10% uncertainty around
the curve nominal point.[32] [54] [46]. Sengupta et. al. suggest that this small of an
uncertainty translates to very low sensitivity in PCT response. The use of the 10% uni-
form distribution for possibly uncertain parameters is not novel. This approach typically
lends conservatism to the analysis since its justiﬁcation is that it covers the span of the
most uncertain ITF transmitters and measurement devices (typically 1-3% around the
nominal point). Thus, while a normal distribution is probably more realistic, a uniform
distribution was applied for conservatism. More so, this application allows the analyst
to attribute uncertainties for sensitivity studies without the sometimes laborious justiﬁ-52
cation required when declaring bounding values. Reactor feedback in terms of neutronic
reactivity was not considered due to the use of heater rods in the APEX1000 facility.
This leaves the realization that such phenomenon could not be veriﬁed with IET data.
Likewise, reactor kinetics were not used in the nodalization of APEX in RELAP5.
In order to account for the age in the cycle-length of a theoretical nuclear core, axial
peaking factors were varied in a way commensurate with the TPG, while initial condi-
tions reﬂective of previous APEX data remained as nominal points.[54] Shumway et. al.
has described issues uncertainty arising from the calculation of the minimum stable ﬁlm
boiling temperature for core rods used to predict post-CHF heat transfer coeﬃcients.[27]
In RELAP5 Mod 3.3, this value is used for HTC calculations in all user-deﬁned ge-
ometries following CHF by way of the Bromley correlations.[19] The TPG suggests that
the minimum stable ﬁlm boiling temperature be varied in a manner described in Table
5.3. This is currently infeasible due to the lack of programming knowledge concerning
RELAP5, and the lack of inclusion of code hooks in the current version of SNAP (see
Section 6.2). Therefore, due to the dependency on wall temperature (core cladding) in
the Bromley correlation, the distribution was applied to the core heater rod temperatures
as initial conditions. This attribution should act to add conservatism due to the majority
of sampling space lying above the nominal point.
Another popularized uncertainty contributor involves the state of knowledge con-
cerning the fuel material composition and degradation. This is typically broken into
individual thermo-physical parameters such as emmissivity, conductivity/resistivity, and
heat capacity. Depending on the TH code used or level of knowledge of its internals,
individual correlations may be given uncertainty bands as advocated by the TPG and
demonstrated using the TRAC-PF1 MOD1 code (See Table 2.2).[54][38] While it has
been described that this level of access to the RELAP5 subroutines is beyond the scope
of this analysis, the code fortunately wields elegant "bulk" access to these parameters
via a fouling factor. This fouling factor is applied to all heat transfer correlations applied
to a particular heat structure which may consist of many subdivisions of diﬀerent mate-
rials. The most limiting input parameter in the TPG analysis is the surface convective
heat transfer coeﬃcient, varied -25% to +75% around its nominal point. Therefore, this
distribution was applied in uniformity to the fouling factor associated with the heater53
rod heat structure wielding a nominal point of one.
Finally, reactor SCRAM time was analyzed under uncertainty to account for possible
mechanical or human error upon the sudden loss or decrease in feedwater ﬂow. This ﬁnite
delay is most important, as a full-powered core will quickly deplete the secondary heatsink
leaving the primary vulnerable to bulk boiling and core uncovery. Iannello describes after
reviewing loss-of-oﬀsite power data applied to test facilities and the Zion-1 NPP, the time
of SCRAM is strongly weighted towards 0.5 seconds, with a light tail extending beyond 2
seconds.[32] This invites the application of the Log-Normal distribution, where the PDF
may be strongly weighted towards an instantaneous reaction of the control-rod drive
mechanisms. Parameters describing the PDF are given in Table 5.3, and due to the LHS
approach taken in this report it is worth noting that a maximum independent value of 3
seconds was applied to avoid unnecessary code failures.
5.1.3 Reactor Cooling System Component Parameters
The importance of the reactor coolant pump operation has been given the Westinghouse-
derived rating of low importance due to the lack of interest in forced convection dur-
ing a feed-and-bleed process. RCP operation inhibits the evolution and development of
natural circulation-driven ﬂow that is important in the study of passive F&Bs. More
so, the pump hydraulic components included in the APEX1000 RELAP5 model utilize
pre-deﬁned Westinghouse canned motor pump coast-down data, leaving a proper uncer-
tainty propagation out of the user’s reach. More details concerning the RCS nodalization
is given in Section 6.1. RCS wall-stored energy was assigned a low importance rating
due to the magnitude of diﬀerence between RCS stored energy and core stored energy
during the blowdown phase. This line of reasoning is similar to the approach taken by
the TPG, where heat conduction and capacity uncertainty is solely applied to regions in
the core.[38] Likewise, the NRC considers the eﬀect of heat transfer in reactor coolant
piping to be of low importance in all PWR non-LOCA transients.[12]
Perhaps the more critical observable variables in performing a successful F&B are
parameters relating to ﬂuid conditions inside of the pressurizer. As previously described,
it is imperative that phase separation occur prior to the PORV/ADS exit line such that54
an optimal amount of energy per unit mass may be released from the primary system.[15]
While phase separation is not a directly perturbable parameter, it may be inﬂuenced by
surrounding parameters such as PORV properties, and heater-rod conditions. Further-
more, the geometry or nodalization of the surge line and connection points aﬀect RCS
to PZR pressure drops, counter-current ﬂow, and liquid entrainment. The ADS-1 valve
(AP1000 PORV) is attributed with open/close rate uncertainty, ﬂuid friction uncertainty,
and variability in the upper and lower setpoints. Sampling in these regions allows for
a ﬁne-tuned assessment as to where the optimal operating pressure band lies for the
APEX1000 facility. Heater rods are completely isolated upon transient restart in order
to refrain from skewing the mass and energy balance from the F&B under study. Finally,
surge line geometry and nodalization is assumed to be correct due to its use in previous
code validations. A sensitivity study described below allows for preliminary assessment
as to the accuracy and suitability of the current nodalization.
5.1.4 Secondary Fluid Parameters
The primary driving force for analyzing F&B procedures in great detail is the dealing
with a loss of main feedwater to the steam generators. In similar fashion to a LOCA, this
feedwater loss can vary in severity from a small break to an instantaneous total loss of
ﬂow. In limiting cases or conservative calculations, a nearly instantaneous loss of heat sink
is also considered. In traditional, and possibly more realistic, simulations such as the one
covered below, feedwater ﬂow is removed at the time of restart and sensitivity studies are
applied to initial ﬂuid levels. While many of the previous F&B sensitivity studies do not
account for an initial uncertainty in SG boiler voiding, Shimeck et. al. determined that
this remains a potentially important parameter when also accounting for human errors
such as HPSI actuation or mechanical failures.[15] Retracting to the common standard of
ignorance, a 10% uniform uncertainty was applied to the nominal steady-state main feed
ﬂow rate. SG tube fouling was not considered due to the insigniﬁcance of the perturbation
after the development of signiﬁcant voiding in the boilers.55
5.1.5 Chemical and Volume Control System Parameters
One of the more diﬃcult parameters to assign uncertainty information to is the time of
CVSP actuation and subsequent F&B operation. The problem is two fold due to both
human operator uncertainty and facility originality. Chieﬂy, the development of a quasi-
steady-state F&B operation takes a signiﬁcant amount of time due to residual secondary
heat sink residing in the SG boilers. This ﬂuid must saturate and entirely void before
ﬂuid residing in the RCS will begin to void. The longer one may keep the primary sub-
cooled, the less the net core heating will be once F&B is actuated due to neutronic decay.
The aggregation of these eﬀects result in an optimal time for CVSP injection so that no
disruptions are made to the phase stratiﬁcation once primary voiding begins to occur.
This is further complicated by human error and uncertainty in initial secondary boiler
conditions. Iannello suggests an exponential function with a 10 minute time constant
to describe the ignorance surrounding the optimal time of injection. The exponential
distribution allows for favoring of an early injection, rather than a signiﬁcantly delayed
one. The 10 minute time constant is a product of sensitivity studies applied to 4-loop
Westinghouse reactors where the net power remains negative as per Equation (4.1).[32]
Furthermore, CVSP injection capacities are given multiplicative uniform uncertainties
due to possible errors in translating head-curve information in the development of pres-
sure operating curves, and lack of information surrounding CVS and main feed tank
conditions. This is further justiﬁed due to the lack of actual CVSP inclusion where
ramp-up and coast-down eﬀects may lead to a change in primary conditions.
5.1.6 Simulation-driven Parameters
The ﬁnal three phenomena listed in Table 5.2 are included as generalized simulation-based
issues that have the potential to aﬀect transient development. The ﬁrst of these, non-
condensible accumulation, is frequently treated in uncertainty-based IET literature due
to the potential to accumulate in the vessel and aﬀect condensation heat transfer.[27][54]
This is not considered pertinent for sensitivity studies in any proper F&B process due
to the isolation of the accumulators. Furthermore, it has been determined that the heat
transfer loss does not pose as an issue during the blowdown phase, where RCS pressures
do not invite non-condensible injection capabilities.[38]56
Further description of errors inherent in the version of RELAP5 (Mod 3.3) used in
this analysis is given in Section 6.1.2. The errors that have been associated and treated
with an F&B transient are described in Section 5.1.1 and Table 5.3. System nodalization
is assumed to be qualiﬁed as per the ITF comparison described in Section 6.1.3.
Table 5.2: PIRT for APEX1000 Feed-and-Bleed Transient
Component and System Phenomena Ranking
Critical Flow H
Vessel: Mixing (Nodalization) H
Vessel: Flashing in Upper Head L
Core: Reactivity Feedback N/A
Core: Reactor Trip H
Core: Decay Heat H
Core: Forced Convection H
Core: Peaking Factors L
Core: Natural Circulation Flow and Heat Transfer H
Core: Initial Stored Heat M
Core: Initial Fouling (Emmissivity, Conduction, Heat Capacity) M
Core: Minimum Stable Film Boiling Temperature M
Core: Gap Conductance N/A
RCP Coastdown Performance L
RCS Wall Stored Heat L
Pressurizer: Fluid Conditions H
Pressurizer: Surge-line Pressure Drop M
ADS: Open/Close Rate M
ADS: Set-point Pressures M
ADS: Form Loss H
SG Heat Transfer H
Secondary Fluid Initial Conditions H
CVSP: Injection Capacity H
CVSP: Actuation Time H
Non-condensibles N/A
RELAP5 Errors H
System Nodalization H57
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5.2 Primary Response Functions
While the advent of non-parametric statistical sampling methods has relieved the neces-
sity to limit the number of input parameters sampled to reach the 95/95 criterion, the
number of response functions now aﬀects the required samples. A C++ script demon-
strating the eﬀect of response functions on sampling requirements is given in Appendix
A.3. Thus, while a variety of key process phenomenon will be monitored at their 95th per-
centiles, it remains feasible to assess only one response function also with 95% epistemic
uncertainty. The current acceptance criteria for an LWR ECCS involves maintaining PCT
below 2,220oF, minimizing cladding oxidation below 0.17 times the cladding thickness,
and limiting the hydrogen generation due to Zircaloy-Steam chemical reactions. While
described further in later sections, it is worth noting that the current RELAP5 model
does not wield the ability to predict heat structure oxidation nor hydrogen production.
Thus, PCT remains the natural choice for the response function assessed at the 95/95
criterion. A summary of the remaining operating parameters assessed continuously at
their 95th percentiles and their justiﬁcation for inclusion is given below in Table 5.4.59
Table 5.4: Key Passive Feed-and-bleed Operating Parameters
Operating Parameter Justiﬁcation
PZR Pressure
Determining RCS pressure
Fluid phase determination
Eﬀects ADS-1 mass ﬂow rate
Outﬂow energy determination
PZR Temperature
Fluid phase determination
Outﬂow energy determination
ADS-1 Flow Rate
RCS Mass ﬂow balance
RCS Energy ﬂow balance
CVS Feed Temperature Inﬂow energy determination
CVSP Flow Rate
RCS Mass ﬂow balance
RCS Energy ﬂow balance
Core Inlet Temperature Study thermal mixing
Core Decay Heat RCS Energy ﬂow balance
Hot/Cold Leg Temperature Study thermal mixing phenomenon
Core Rod Temperature
Determination of boiling regime
Determination of peak temperature
RCS Loop Flow Rate
Analyze mass transport
Analyze energy tranport60
Chapter 6: Overview of Virtual APEX Nodalization and Job Stream
6.1 APEX Rev. 2b RELAP5 Mod 3.3 Model
The current RELAP5 Mod 3.3 base input deck modeling APEX was built making signif-
icant alterations to the APEX600 deck originally provided by the ISL. In addition all the
boundary and initial conditions for a feed-and-bleed test were implemented in the input
deck, and are described further in Section 6.1.1. The nodalization diagram is given in
Figure 6.1.[28]61
Figure 6.1: Volume nodalization of the APEX1000 facility in RELAP5 Mod 3.362
The base-input deck is run in RELAP5 to converge upon a steady-state result rep-
resenting normal operation. The Rev. 2b steady-state input deck was constrained by
introducing a Time Dependent Volume (TDV) and controllers in order to establish the
steady state initial values of the system pressure, PZR level and steam and feed water
ﬂows in a short time. The TDVs were removed from the restart run to eliminate the feed
and bleed function that maintains the plant at steady-state. After the plant reached its
steady-state conditions, the base run was terminated. A restart input deck for the acci-
dent transient simulation was then run with the initial and boundary conditions achieved
in the steady-state run.
All primary and secondary systems of APEX were modeled into the RELAP5 input
deck, including core region, upper and lower plenums, downcomer, cold and hot legs,
SGs, etc. Speciﬁc design characteristics of the APEX system, such as insulation, were
modeled into the code to ensure accurate heat retention in the RCS over the course of the
transient. Regardless of their isolation in this particular test, the passive safety systems,
such as CMT, ACC, PRHR and IRWST, have been carefully investigated during the
modeling in order to obtain accurate gravity force and ﬂow friction representation.
6.1.1 Model Revisions Commensurate with a Feed-and-Bleed Test
A moderate amount of revisions were required to the APEX Rev. 2a input deck to accu-
rately model the feed-and-bleed quasi-steady-state operation. Previous to this analysis,
the entirety of the Chemical and Volume Control System was not modeled in the RELAP
nodalization. To properly model the continual injection of potable makeup water from
the Feedwater Storage Tank, a Time-dependent volume was introduced where feedwater
temperature was maintained at 72.23 oF. In order to avoid the tedious and sometimes
arbitrary task of modeling pump performance using a specialized single-volume compo-
nent, CVSP response to pressurizer pressure was replaced by the redundant downstream
motor valve’s (RCS-808) prescribed volumetric ﬂow rate. In short, injection pressure
from the TDV was maintained at pressurizer pressure, while a time-dependent junction
(TDJ) was placed downstream with a volumetric ﬂow rate determined using the following
relation,
˙ Q(gal/min)= 3.827954x10 3 ⇤ PPZR+5 .32547, (6.1)63
where PPZR represents pressurizer pressure in the upper dome in pounds per square
inch.[13] This TDJ is connected directly to the inlet of the lower channel head of SG-2,
as depicted in Figure 6.1 above. CVS isolation logic was enabled through the use of a
variable and logical trip combination. A steady-state latched-false trip is declared so that
the CVS remains isolated during normal operation. The trip is inverted at the restart,
allowing CVSP to be accessed according to a variable trip. CVSP logic dictates that
the pump be tripped immediately following a pressure rise in the pressurizer > 385 psig.
Thus, monitoring is performed via the use of a control variable to falsify a trip and im-
mediately quench ﬂow if this condition occurs. Moreover, this control variable is used as
the independent variable in a table lookup to determine the TDJ injection capacity as
outlined in Equation (6.1).
The graded approach to applying the evaluation model development and assessment
process (EMDAP) outlined in NUREG 1.203 was accounted for when deciding the level
of interest that was required in performing Element 2 of the CSAU process (see steps
7-10 in Figure 2.1).[12] This is justiﬁed on the grounds that the following four attributes
are considered using expert opinion and/or sensitivity calculation. First, the novelty of
the revised TH model requires comparison to the currently accepted model. As outlined
in Section 6.1.3, the nodalization of APEX using RELAP5 has previously undergone
qualiﬁcation using quality-assured ITF data commensurate to NQA-1 standards. In
implementing the F&B capabilities, no changes were made to signiﬁcant safety system
nodalizations, closure relations, or thermophysical properties. As such, the novelty of
the F&B implementation is considered to be minimal. This correlates with the second
requirement in that the complexity of the event being analyzed must not signiﬁcantly
exceed prior qualiﬁed studies. CVS implementation is an extraneous addition to the
evaluation model which makes use of PRHR injection paths used in prior studies.[37][33]
This is also justiﬁed due to CVSP monitoring of PRZ pressure only, which is a previously
qualiﬁed parameter. Next, the degree of conservatism must not signiﬁcantly diminish
due to a special application. Preliminary sensitivity studies suggest the conservatism in
a F&B approach to core heat removal is highly dependent on human uncertainty param-
eters including, but not limited to, the time of CVSP injection. This fact coupled with
the use of uncertainty biases described in Section 5.1.1 should act to signiﬁcantly increase
the conservatism in the following F&B study. The ﬁnal listed attribute requires studying64
the extent of any plant design or operational changes that would require reanalysis. This
requirement is also nulliﬁed, due to the lack of alterations in RCS and core nodalization
that are known to appropriately develop and describe natural phenomenon expected in
a passive system. Iteration of newly-implemented CVSP capabilities and functions are
analyzed in the sensitivity analysis portion of the work ﬂow (Section 6.3) to determine
whether further analysis is required in modeling this capability.
The restart case was heavily modiﬁed to account for the array of component isolations
needed to perform an adequate feed-and-bleed experiment. Trips used to determine an
open condition for the CMT’s, ADS2&3, ADS4-1 and ADS4-2, breaks, PRHR HX, and
RCP’s were latched false. To adequately predict the histerisis eﬀect in a LOFW accident,
mass injection rates from the TDV’s supplying SG-1 and SG-2 with feedwater were set
to zero, enabling the secondary heat sink to boil oﬀ. Finally, it has been determined
that operation of the pressurizer water heaters aﬀects the system pressure response, the
ﬂow quality, and ﬂow rate from the pressurizer relief valve.[15] This skews the mass and
energy balance from the F&B under current study. Thus, the power emanating from the
pressurizer water heaters was turned oﬀ in the restart case. Minimum time intervals and
transient length were both elongated to enable more rapid permutations while logging
long-term cooling capabilities.
6.1.2 RELAP5 Applicability and Limitations
The Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program (RELAP) is a ﬁnite-volume LWR
transient analysis code developed through a joint venture between the Idaho National En-
gineering Laboratory (INEL), the NRC, and DOE.[16] The models and numerical schemes
inherent in RELAP were constructed to include signiﬁcant ﬁrst-order eﬀects such that
accurate inferences can be made from integral systems tests while rapid iterations are
achievable for parametric and sensitivity analyses. While the newest versions of RELAP
include implicit solving of both non-homogeneous and non-equilibrium models necessary
for two-phase system simulation, certain limitations with the capability of altering IET
accuracy remain.[17] Of the many limitations logged for the release of RELAP5 Mod
3.3, the following conditions wield the potential to aﬀect the feed-and-bleed analysis
contained in this report. A more detailed description of the identiﬁcation and ranking65
of phenomenon aﬀecting simulation uncertainty is given in Chapter 5. The RELAP5
development team suggests that mass ﬂow rates tend to be exaggerated in conditions
involving critical ﬂow due to the lack of accounting for inter-facial slipping. Due to pas-
sive, stratiﬁed ﬂow in the hot legs, this issue is likely to go unnoticed. Next, it has been
determined that under stratiﬁed conditions in which mist ﬂow is evident, interfacial heat
transfer is said to be overstated. The possibility then arises of predicting erroneous en-
ergy removal rates through ADS1, adding further uncertainty to the necessary operating
pressure band. Finally, the very nature of the ﬁnite-volume capabilities of RELAP5 cou-
pled with the limited nodalization of the APEX model is expected to poorly simulate 2
and 3-dimensional eﬀects. This is mostly attributed to the loss of convective momentum
terms at the cross-ﬂow junctions except for those in the primary ﬂow direction.[17] The
most signiﬁcant example of this limitation lies in determining the thermal mixing occur-
ring at points of ECCS bypass injection, a widely published shortfall of ﬁnite-volume TH
software.[53][38] In this passive feed-and-bleed analysis, it is expected that mixing and
subsequent condensation eﬀects will be poorly modeled at the CVS injection point in the
SG-2 lower channel head.
6.1.3 Qualiﬁcation of APEX RELAP5 Nodalization
Owing to the fact that no signiﬁcant geometric alterations were applied for the RELAP
base input deck, previous input deck qualiﬁcations are applicable to the steady-state case.
Recently, convergence of the base input deck was tested preceding the OSU-AP1000-05
test involving a 2" break at the bottom of CL-4 with one valve failure occurring in the
ADS-4.[37][28] Under the steady-state condition, forced circulation using the RCP’s was
produced for 800 seconds to allow for proper convergence upon the initial conditions
required for an IET. Acceptable convergence upon stable pressure conditions was found
relatively quickly, and can be seen below in Figure 6.2.
Table 6.1 below compares thermal-hydraulic parameters of interest determined after
1,200 seconds of convergence to values obtained for the OSU-AP1000-05 test. It is felt
that excellent agreement exists between the two values, and the steady-state base input
deck is considered to be qualiﬁed. [37]66
Figure 6.2: Primary Loop Pressure (Steady-State RELAP5 Results)
Transient qualiﬁcation is not directly feasible for the feed-and-bleed analysis due to
the lack of applicable test data. Furthermore, costs remain prohibitively high to com-
mence a feed-and-bleed IET in time for qualiﬁcation of this experiment. Nevertheless,
recent success has been made in using the APEX RELAP5 base model to predict key phe-
nomenon occurring in a 2" CL-4 break LOCA both quantitatively and qualitatively.[28]
A clear separation and matching of phenomenological windows between the RELAP com-
putation and IET data proves the safety injection systems and passive ﬂow channels are
well-nodalized. Table 6.2 compares actuation times of characteristic LOCA responses
between OSU-AP1000-05 and RELAP5 results. Comparison dictates that the timing of
events is in reasonable agreement, and the transient is considered qualiﬁed.67
Table 6.1: Measured and RELAP5-calculated Initial Conditions for OSU-AP1000-05
Testing
Parameter OSU-AP1000-05 RELAP-5 Calculated
PZR Pressure (MPa) 26.5 26.5
PZR Level (cm) 201.2 201.4
PZR Temperature (K) 502.1 500.2
Cold-Leg #1 Temp. (K) 489.4 489.6
Cold-Leg #2 Temp. (K) 489.3 489.5
Cold-Leg #3 Temp. (K) 489.8 489.6
Cold-Leg #4 Temp. (K) 489.5 489.5
Hot-Leg #1 Temp. (K) 492.4 492.4
Hot-Leg #2 Temp. (K) 493.2 492.4
CMT#1 Temp. (K) 295.4 295.4
CMT#2 Temp. (K) 295.2 295.2
ACC#1 Temp. (K) 293.4 293.3
ACC#1 Pressure (MPa) 14.1 14.1
ACC#1 Level (cm) 99.0 99.0
ACC#2 Temp. (K) 295.7 295.8
ACC#2 Pressure (MPa) 14.2 14.2
ACC#2 Level (cm) 93.4 93.4
IRWST Temp. (K) 286.4 286.4
SG-1 Pressure (MPa) 2.1 2.1
SG-2 Pressure (MPa) 2.1 2.1
6.2 Symbolic Nuclear Analysis Package Job Stream
In order to analyze integral eﬀects on the vast scale required for proper uncertainty and
sensitivity analysis, a mating of specialized vendor-supplied software is required to per-
form parametric processing and data extraction on multiple executions of the TH code.
Speciﬁcally, a batch-style job stream was developed in the Symbolic Nuclear Analysis
Package (SNAP) to enable graphical enhancement of the APEX RELAP model and nec-
essary UQ/SA input. Descriptions of the APEX model, SNAP streams, and signiﬁcant
plug-ins are given in the sections below.68
Table 6.2: Sequence of Events for TEST OSU-AP1000-05 and RELAP5 Prediction
Parameter OSU-AP1000-05 (sec) RELAP-5 Calculated (sec)
Break Initiated 0 0
SS i g n a l 0 0
CMT-1 Opens 6 5.6
CMT-2 Opens 6 5.6
PRHR Opens 6 5.6
RCPs Trip 9 5.6
ADS-1 Opens 418 549
ADS-2 Opens 465 602
ADS-3 Opens 525 662
ADS4-1 Opens 846 1,033
ADS4-2 Opens 816 1,063
IRWST Injection Begins 1,504 1,350
In 2008, the Symbolic Nuclear Analysis Package (SNAP) was created through a
joint venture between the USNRC and Applied programming technology.[34] The goal
of the program was to develop a common application framework for engineering analy-
sis (CAFEAN) through a pre-processor plug-in application programming interface. As
such, SNAP relies on plug-ins to bridge the gap between graphical manipulation and
third-party code input such as RELAP, TRAC, and TRACE.
In 2010, a crude uncertainty plug-in was made available that enabled the TH model
developer to iterate on a speciﬁc code module via the sampling of user-deﬁned numerics
with characteristic input distributions. The output of each run is then collected and an-
alyzed by the APT-Plot software where pivotal quantities are isolated and tabulated at
user discretion via APT-Plot scripts speciﬁed in the SNAP job stream. At the conclusion
of this step, the response data is aggregated and formalized into a format readable by
the Design Analysis Kit for Optimization and Terascale Applications (DAKOTA) appli-
cation. In the ﬁnal step, sensitivity analyses and graphical representations of response69
data are performed by DAKOTA and returned to the SNAP interface where a formalized
report regarding user-speciﬁed data is created in the Open Document Format (ODF).[5]
SNAP wields the capability to iterate upon multiple code modules, referred to as
Model Nodes, such that both RELAP steady-state and restart input parameters may be
attributed to user-deﬁned numerics with probability distributions. Limitations exist in
this functionality, in that parameters used in thermal-hydraulic correlations built into
RELAP5 may not be accessed or deﬁned as numerics. The ease of use in performing
batch analysis of RELAP iterations within the SNAP interface allows for a greater num-
ber of response functions (FOMs) to be declared. The current SNAP job stream is shown
below in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3: SNAP Parametric Job Stream for Feed-and-bleed Uncertainty Analysis
As depicted, the APEX RELAP5 input deck containing the proper geometry and con-
trol variables are located in the Base_Model where all parameters may be edited directly
from the SNAP interface. The input deck is fed to the RELAP code in the base_job
stream step where the restart-plot (.RSTPLT) ﬁle is accrued and placed onto the job
stream stage. The accrual of the plot ﬁle denotes the completion of the steady-state cal-
culation, meaning the restart input model denoted by the RESTART CASE input model
node is fed the Restart stream step. This step also receives the restart-plot deck in order
to gather the necessary thermal hydraulic data to begin the transient at steady-state70
values. Once the restart calculation is completed, the data collection and uncertainty
quantiﬁcation steps are commenced following the parametric steps.
In the previous year, the uncertainty and RELAP5 plug-in has been updated to allow
nearly every parameter to be attributed to a user-deﬁned numeric such as a real, integer,
Boolean, or tabulated value. The uncertainty plug-in contains a robust toolkit for deﬁn-
ing how these numerics are varied and to what parameters they are attributed to. This
is helpful in order to revert the analysis back to a simple nominal value (non-parametric)
calculation on the ﬂy. The user has a wide array of methods at their disposal for varying
the nominal value of the user deﬁned numeric. Distributions including Normal, Uniform,
Triangular, Exponential, Beta, Gamma, Weibull, and histograms may be used as a multi-
plicative, additive, or subtractive rule, or as a scalar replacing the nominal value entirely.
Refer to Chapter 5 for a detailed description concerning the motivation for selected un-
certainty parameters, input uncertainties, and response functions.
Once the ﬁgures of merit are chosen for the analysis, the user deﬁnes the probability
and conﬁdence criteria required for the output. Owing to the current regulatory require-
ments, the 95/95 criteria is selected and the number of code runs is determined using the
one-sided Binomial Bayesian Method. Sampling in the SNAP job stream is allowed using
either the pseudo-random inverse-CDF (Monte-Carlo) method or the Latin-Hypercube
sampling method. When attributing purely uniform distributions to the input param-
eters, the choice of sampling scarcely matters. Finally, the ability to account for code
failures is available by selecting a proportion of samples to be calculated as backup.
6.3 Preliminary Sensitivity Study
Before commencing the large number of runs required to produce 95% variablity and
95% epistemic uncertainty limits on the PCT, a sensitivity study was performed in order
to glean information pertaining to the eﬀect input parameters have on resulting PCT
uncertainty. To accomplish this, a sampling matrix was created for ten steady-state and
restart code runs as per the uncertainty criteria summarized in Table 5.3. Following
successful completion of the runs, the DAKOTA statistical analysis program was used
for sensitivity reporting of four standard correlation criteria between the input parameter71
and response function described below.
DAKOTA allows the user to perform a raw correlation between two variables (input
and output are probably the most useful) via the Pearson product-moment correlation
coeﬃcient (PCC). This correlation may be further separated into a simple and partial
PCCs, where the latter will adjust for the eﬀects of all other variables that have the po-
tential to skew the correlation. PCCs assume a linear relation between the two variables,
and the coeﬃcient lies inclusively between -1 and 1 denoting a strong or weak inverse or
direct relationship. The simple PCC is deﬁned as the co-variance of the two variables
normalized by the multiplication of their standard deviations as shown in Equation (6.2),
⇢X,Y =
cov(X,Y)
 X Y
=
E[(X   µX)(Y   µY )]
 X Y
, (6.2)
where X and Y denote the variables in question, and µ denotes the mean (ﬁrst moment
about the origin) of the variable, leading to the "product-moment" modiﬁer in the name.
In this analysis, samples of inputs and outputs are compared n times, where n denotes
the number of code runs garnered from a non-parametric statistical technique. With this
in mind, Equation (6.2) collapses into the following form,
r =
Pn
i=1(Xi   ¯ X)(Yi   ¯ Y )
qPn
i=1(Xi   ¯ X)2
qPn
i=1(Yi   ¯ Y )2
, (6.3)
where ¯ X is a sample mean. While Equation (6.3) is relatively straightforward to calculate
once the appropriate data has been gathered, the underlying linear regression assump-
tions leaves it susceptible to bad statistics. Succinctly, DAKOTA developers at Sandia
Laboratories declare the simple PCC fallacious to use in samples less than a couple hun-
dred. Preferably, it is declared that Equation (6.3) be used in samples where n exceeds
1000.[7] Due to time and cost constraints, this remains infeasable in our current analysis,
and more stable and informative partial correlations must be used instead. The partial
sample PCC is calculated after creating a matrix of the simple PCCs including all vari-
ables. In other words, let P = ||⇢i,j||, where ⇢i,j is the PCC between Xi and Xj. The
partial PCC, accounting for the aﬀects of variables 3 through n, is then calculated via72
Equation (6.4),
⇢1,2;3...n =
P1,2 p
P1,1P2,2
, (6.4)
where Pi,j is the co-factor of the element ⇢i,j in the determinant |P|. Fortunately,
DAKOTA wields the ability to rapidly form the partial PCC matrix and perform the
operations needed in Equation (6.4). It has been found that after only 10-15 runs the
partial PCCs return meaningful correlation information robust enough to make PIRT
decisions based upon sensitivities alone.
It is suggested that linear regression relations are often not robust enough in the
cases where the variables under comparison extend over orders of magnitude or contain
outliers.[7] in this case, DAKOTA contains the ability to compare data under statistical
ranking, thereby assessing the monotonicity of the two samples. The formula to do so is
often coined the Spearman Rank Correlation Coeﬃcient (SCC) , and it is given below
via Equation (6.5),
⇢ =1 
6
Pn
i=1(xi   yi)2
n(n2   1)
, (6.5)
where xi and yi denote the sample ranks. It should be noted that Equation (6.5) is valid
only when "rank ties" are known to not exist, as would be the case with RELAP5 input
and output. In the case ties do exist, the simple and partial SCCs revert to Equations
(6.3) and (6.4) after replacing the variable values with ranks.
Summation of the sensitivity results gleaned from the test run is given below in Table
6.3. It should be noted at the outset that apart from the core temperature oﬀset, all
parameters are perturbations in the form of multiplicative factors, and thus diﬀer by
orders of magnitude from PCT response. It is therefore unlikely that either the simple or
partial PCC values are of much use in this small sample. Nevertheless, it can be seen that
ten sensitivity runs may not be statistically signiﬁcant due to the uninformative partial
rank values given for most of the parameters. It is worth mentioning that while fouling of
the fuel heat transfer capabilities did in fact assume a signiﬁcant direct correlation with
PCT, the magnitude of signiﬁcance is not large enough to justify a more detailed study of
uncertainty in the correlations used. Perhaps most interestingly, the loss of initial liquid
mass between SG-1 and SG-2 resulted in opposite eﬀects on resulting PCT. As to be73
expected, perturbation of initial inventory in SG-1 lead to a decreasing monotonic trend,
or inverse relationship with PCT. However, loss of SG-2 inventory statistically leads to a
decrease in PCT. Due to the limited number of code runs, this may be due to insuﬃcient
statistics. On the other hand, due to the CVSP injection point being located in the
SG-2 lower channel (see Figure 4.2), the loss of heat sink in this regime could result in
unforeseen circulation developments upon CVSP actuation that aid in core heat removal.
Owing to the aforementioned limitations in RELAP5 when accounting for 3-dimensional
mixing, this development may lend credence to the use of the single hot-channel bias
described in Section 5.1.1 and Table 5.3. Finally, it is to be expected that delay in the
activation of F&B through CVSP actuation would result in the largest eﬀect on PCT.
Due to the F&B logic granted to the ADS-1 valves, once the reactor has been scrammed
and the secondary has boiled away, the core will quickly saturate, void, and uncover due
to the maintaining of the optimal pressure band described in Section 4.1. Thus, excessive
CVSP delay will surely lead to large spikes in PCT, and the uncertainty in this parameter
may need to be reduced in order to mitigate the number of code failures. Nevertheless,
the negligible contributions to PCT response from parameters such as fuel fouling and
CVSP head uncertainty which were expected to be highly signiﬁcant lead the author to
believe further component uncertainty studies are unnecessary.
6.4 Derivation of Sampling Requirements
The sampling requirements commensurate with an OSU APEX1000 feed-and-bleed sim-
ulation were derived using a subjectivist form of probability via the Binomial Bayesian
techniques brieﬂy described in Section 2.5.3. As previously mentioned, much of the work
involved in correctly performing an Binomial Bayesian update involves accounting for
meaningful pre-conceived notions in the form of a probability distribution. In this case,
the pre-conceived notions take the simple form of the probability density distribution of
the code success probability. While the author has no previous experience in determin-
ing such data, two speciﬁc PWR feed-and-bleed analyses have been described in recent
literature and analyzed under uncertainty. Both descriptions result in an estimate for
the probability of a feed-and-bleed procedure to successfully cool the core following a
LOFW accident. Victor Iannello arguably constructed the ﬁrst study on a Westinghouse
4-loop PWR experiencing F&B following a LOFW under uncertainty using a code de-74
Table 6.3: APEX1000 Sensitivity Study: PCT Response Correlations
Parameter Simple Partial Simple Rank Partial Rank
SCRAM Delay 0.0416497 0.138643 0.393939 0.0983739
Decay Curve Factor -0.190732 0.138643 0.478788 -0.0983739
ADS-1 Upper Setpoint 0.33362 -0.138643 0.29697 -0.0983739
ADS-1 Lower Setpoint -0.220271 -0.138643 0.345455 -0.0983739
ADS-1 Open/Close Rate -0.357685 0.138643 -0.248485 -0.0983739
ADS Discharge Coeﬀ. 0.575897 0.138643 0.236364 0.0983739
CVSP Injection Capacity 0.329903 0.138643 0.309091 -0.0983739
Core Temperature Oﬀset 0.532081 -0.138643 0.187879 -0.0983739
Fuel Fouling Factor 0.401473 0.0503244 0.442424 0.166394
SG1 Liquid Inventory -0.373268 -0.222778 -0.393939 -0.342854
SG2 Liquid Inventory -0.16188 0.0959066 -0.00606061 0.13107
CVSPDelay 0.852073 0.585453 0.272727 0.263117
veloped speciﬁcally for the purpose of studying the energy and mass balance in such
an experiment.[32] It was determined that the procedure was adequate in removing the
decay heat with 64% probability. A more recent analysis of Siemens PWRs undergoing
F&Bs under uncertainty determined that failure to remove the decay heat is expected
in less than 1% of cases. Alternatively, F&B success probability is expected to be 99%.
With these two known data points, or "knot points", we may construct a prior distribu-
tion of our choosing, justifying any constraints placed on the data.
While a simple uniform distribution is often justiﬁable on the grounds that only the
data boundaries need be declared, it is not felt that this move is suﬃcient with such
a sparse history. There may be a chance, albeit a very small one, that the probability
of F&B success lies below the 64% mark. It is therefore enviable to use a "tailed"
distribution, specifying the upper and lower bounds at particular quantiles. In order to
avoid arguments and remain as non-informative as possible given the circumstances, the
normal distribution was chosen with zero skew (3rd moment of the mean), and the upper
and lower knot points were associated with the lower 1% and 99% quantiles, respectively.75
Mathematical description of this can be seen in Equations (6.6) and (6.7),
Z 0.64
1
f(x)dx =0 .01, (6.6)
Z 0.99
1
f(x)dx =0 .99, (6.7)
where f(x) represents the general probability distribution function. This allows for sam-
pling to occur outside of the bounds 2% of the time. Owing to the assumption of a zero
skew and symmetry about the quantiles, a mean for the distribution is calculated via
using the simple diﬀerence method,
µ =
0.06373 + 0.99
2
=0 .81365. (6.8)
Finally, in order to fully develop the prior distribution, a prior data variance must be
determined. Considering the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) at both the 1st
and 99th percentiles are already described through Equations (6.6) and (6.7), these two
conditions may be used in isolating the variance. The normal distribution is described
in Equation (6.9), and the CDF (Equation (6.10) is found by integrating the PDF,
⇡(µ, |p)=
1
p
2⇡ 2exp
⇥
 
1
2
(
p   µ
 
)2⇤
, (6.9)
⇧(µ, |p)=
1
2
⇥
1+erf(
p   µ
p
2 2)], (6.10)
where erf() denotes the error function, a special function. An equality was made between
the ratios of the two 99% quantile CDFs shown in Equation (6.11), and a numerical solve
was performed using the Mathematica R   computation software,
[1 + erf(0.6373 0.81365 p
2 2 )]
[1 + erf(0.99 0.81365 p
2 2 )]
=
0.1
0.99
(6.11)
The standard deviation was found to be the following,
  ! 0.0758055. (6.12)76
Coupling the newly formed prior distribution to the Binomial distribution characterizing
the pass/fail nature of code successes described in Section 2.5.3, a Bayesian update may
be performed, and a posterior predictive distribution is found via Equation (6.13),
⇡(p|µ, )=
pN n(1   p)n
R 1
0 pN n(1   p)ne
  1
2
 
p µ p
2 2
 
dp
˙ e
  1
2
 
p µ p
2 2
 
, (6.13)
where N denotes the total number of samples, and n accounts for the number of code
failures. Appendix B contains the raw input needed to develop the prior distribution
and export tabulated conﬁdence information. Equation (6.13) may either be analyzed
following a particular number of runs, or calculated at the outset if the number of failures
is assumed a priori. Table 6.4 summarizes the number of samples required to reach the
95/95 probability/conﬁdence criteria using Equation (6.13) against a particular number
of code failures. It is demonstrated that a large number of samples is required even
if a single failure is not observed. It is apparent that this analysis translates samples
to RELAP5 code runs, which are notoriously lengthy in calculation time. Over the
course of the sensitivity analysis described in Section 6.3, it was found that a single
iteration consisting of a base case and restart translated to roughly four hours. Owing
to the sheer amount of time required to perform the F&B analysis, coupled with the
potential for computer error due to the large volume of data generated at each restart,
an assumption of zero code failures was made before performing the analysis. While
potentially arguable, justiﬁcation for this move can be found in the development of the
prior input distributions described in Section 5.1 and 6.3. It is apparent that the majority
of uncertainty undergoing propagation through the code stems from operator uncertainty
surrounding CVSP injection. More so, the justiﬁcation for using the distribution is rather
antiquated, and perhaps not appropriate for the 21st century operating conditions that
will be made available for AP1000 NPPs. As such, any code failures, should they occur,
will likely be attributable to sampling in the exponential tail of the CVSP injection delay
distribution. Succinctly, 82 independent RELAP5 Mod 3.3 iterations were performed
using Latin-Hypercube samples of the prior input parameter distributions.77
Table 6.4: 95/95 Critera Sampling Chart for PWR F&B Simulation Analyses
Code Failures Samples Required
08 2
11 1 7
21 4 8
31 7 6
42 0 4
52 3 1
62 5 7
72 8 3
83 0 9
93 3 4
10 35978
Chapter 7: Feed-and-Bleed Simulation Results
Aforementioned feed-and-bleed safety response techniques were simulated for the OSU
APEX facility using the RELAP5 Mod 3.3 code. The following sections outline the re-
sults of sensitivity studies using transient run time and ECCS delay time as variable
parameters. 95/95 uncertainty quantiﬁcation was performed on cases involving reason-
able ECCS delays, while percentile uncertainty quantiﬁcation was performed on cases
involving larger delays. To reiterate, steady-state calculations were run to 800 seconds,
and transients were then calculated starting from the end of steady state. Cases involv-
ing uncertainty quantiﬁcation were limited to problem-times of 5,000 seconds due to the
large time cost involved per run, which often exceeded ﬁve hours. As such, additional
analysis has been devoted to a nominal transient extending to 20,000 seconds.
7.1 95/95 Results: CVSP Delay Before 900 seconds
7.1.1 Response Functions
Uncertainty quantiﬁcation at the 95% levels of both probability and conﬁdence was per-
formed on 82 code runs using Latin-Hypercube Sampling of the input distributions de-
scribed in Table 5.3. The single constraint placed upon these distribution involves ﬁxing
the maximum drawn value for delay in CVSP actuation to 900 seconds following the
LOFW. This value was chosen based on operating pressure map optimization and ex-
pected time of primary-to-secondary loss of heat transfer. The ﬁrst 900 seconds of the
transient may be considered a unique phenomenological window due to its similarity to
a 4-loop PWR SB-LOCA blowdown phase.[15] [39]
As described in the PIRT process (Section 5.1.2), consideration of additional bias
in PCT is potentially needed based on the modeling of the APEX core as a single hot
channel. Such modeling practices have been found to lead to 45-65oF biases in PCT if
temperature is not found to be well-mixed at the lower plenum. The continuous distribu-79
tion in lower downcomer ﬂuid temperatures directly below cold legs 1-4 is given in Figure
7.1. Results given in this ﬁgure denote a very well-mixed, nearly uniform temperature
distribution around the annulus at the means. Also, uncertainty by way of the upper
and lower 95th percentiles is also nearly identical apart from the very early stages of the
transient while the reactor coolant pumps are allowed to coast down. These facts, cou-
pled with the relatively small uncertainty in the ﬂuid temperatures ( 17K or 30oF) lends
credence to the idea that a single hot channel nodalization of the core is acceptable for
this analysis. These ﬁndings indicate that an additional hot-channel bias applied to PCT
results is unwarranted, and we may use the simulation results directly in declaring the
95/95 boundary. Continuous peak cladding temperature over transient time is given in
Figure 7.2. Due to the Bayesian sampling argument developed in Section 2.5.3, this is the
only response function where 95% conﬁdence may be declared on the upper values. From
a regulatory standpoint, this ﬁgure represents the only information of concern. While
this analysis remains to be validated with integral-eﬀects-test results, it has declared the
feed-and-bleed response to be a successful one for the APEX facility. At 4,200 seconds
into the transient, no temperature excursions are witnessed, and none are expected in
the near future allowing for the continuing of CVS injection. PCT behavior beyond 4,200
seconds is brieﬂy explored in Section 7.4
A signiﬁcant facet of the transient in need of exploration is the development of nat-
ural circulation in the system. This is pronounced due to the asymmetrical and highly-
subcooled nature of CVS injection in APEX, and the assumed lack of "ﬂuttering" of the
depressurization valves. At the outset, the CVS injection water is assumed to trickle
down cold legs 2&4, the downcomer walls, and pool-boil in the vessel allowing the gen-
erated steam to exit through the hot legs and out of the pressurizer through the ADS
valves. While this route of mass-transport was ultimately seen, allowing for a retention
of heat sink in the core regions, oscillations in mass transport within the core regions
were found to occur. Figure 7.3 describes the uncertainty in direction of mass transport
to and from the core. Speciﬁcally, it determines net transport of mass through the lower
plenum, denoting the core and downcomer as the positive and negative direction, respec-
tively. While Figure 7.3 hides much of the information for speciﬁc transients, it depicts
a nearly even split between positive and negative ﬂow directions in the core. As one
would expect, the mean in this diagram corresponds with the mass ﬂow rate of the CVS80
injection ﬂow, on the order of 0.21-0.3 kg/s. A speciﬁc case involving nearly instanta-
neous CVSP actuation shown in Figure 7.4 demonstrates the oscillations and their timing
shortly after CVSP injection and RCP coast-down. It is shown that periodic ﬂow reversal
is seen in the core such that mass is often times transported to the downcomer regions
from the core. It has been determined that highly superheated steam exists in the upper
head region, regardless of CVSP actuation time. As such, periodic ﬂashing in the upper
regions of the core are expected to cause level swell in the downcomer region, leading to
a net negative mass ﬂow rate through the lower plenum. Following a depressurization in
the upper plenum due to entrainment condensation and exit through the hot leg nozzels,
level swell is pronounced in the core thereby returning the ﬂow direction to its natural
state.
Special interest is given to the ability for a feed-and-bleed transient to successfully
remove the heat introduced by nuclear decay in the fuel and ECCS enthalpy via use of
the ADS valves. Mathematical description of this energy balance is given by Equation
(4.1). RELAP5 Mod 3.3 is equipped to track all of these values via the use of minor edits,
and the resulting balance under uncertainty is given in Figure 7.5. A signiﬁcant power-
to-ﬂow mismatch is expected in all cases for the ﬁrst 700 seconds, where the coast-down
of RCPs allow for excellent heat removal from the core region, which has signiﬁcantly
decreased power output. However, after 700 seconds, all cases are expected to lead to a
net heat retention for the next 1/2 hour, at the minimum. Upon further analysis of the
data, it has been shown that cases leading towards the lower 95th percentile correspond
to CVSP actuation that occurred immediately following the initiation of the transient.
Cases following the upper 95th percentile band correspond to signiﬁcant delays in CVSP
actuation. One possible cause for concern lies in the fact that net heat rejection has not
been established at the mean by 4,200 seconds of transient problem time. Remediation
of this issue is possible in looking for alternate methods of heat rejection not considered
in the current model. While conservative from a safety analysis standpoint, Equation
(4.1) is unrealistic when heat rejection to the secondary is not negligible. Such is the
case when loss of feedwater occurs outside the bounds of the SG boiler and downcomer
regions such that the remaining inventory is allowed to boil dry. When accounting for81
this alternate heat sink, Equation (4.1) is updated as follows,
˙ Qnet = ˙ Qcore +(˙ mh)PF   (˙ mh)RV   ˙ QSG1   ˙ QSG2, (7.1)
where SG1 & 2 represent steam generators 1 & 2, respectively. Accounting for the ad-
ditional heat transfer to the remaining inventory in the steam generators, Figure 7.6
depicts the altered heat retention proﬁle. As shown, the additional heat rejection to
the secondary has a very pronounced eﬀect during the power-to-ﬂow mismatch period,
allowing for a smoother and less-pronounced transition into the heat retention phase.
The time of guaranteed heat retention (at the 95th percentiles) has been reduced from
roughly 21 minutes to 12 minutes. More so, the energy balance at the termination of the
transient for the average case is nearly zero. Thus, it is likely that all cases will begin heat
rejection later in the transient. It is worth noting that the inclusion of environmental
heat loss eﬀects would either further reduce or entirely eliminate the tendency for heat
retention in the system. However, this type of analysis is outside the scope of this study.
The rapid transitions to net heat retention described in Figures 7.5 and 7.6 is a prod-
uct of both the sequestration of RCP coast-down and the loss of heat transfer between
the primary SG U-tubes and secondary SG boiler regions. Inventory at the upper and
lower 95th percentiles for SG 1 & 2 is described in Figure 7.7. The diagram presents
an interesting conclusion, in that complete dryout is not responsible for the quenching
of heat transfer so much as the collection of steam in the primary U-tubes. It is found
that the U-tubes and channel heads dry out very quickly in conditions involving delayed
ECCS injection, thereby severely degrading primary heat transfer. This allows roughly
half of the liquid inventory in the secondary boilers to remain for the duration of the
transient. The uncertainty in ultimate collapsed liquid level is directly tied to CVSP
actuation, where earlier injection will allow for longer periods of liquid presence in the
SG U-tubes allowing for heat transfer.
Figure 7.8 demonstrates the pressure proﬁle measured in the pressurizer dome under
uncertainty over the course of the transient. An initial spike in pressure which is above
the CVSP threshold of 350 psia is due to the power-to-ﬂow mismatch which is able to
collapse the voided dome and reject low quality ﬂuid out of the stuck-open ADS-1 valve.82
The remainder of the pressure proﬁle is nearly decreasing monotonic with time with the
exception of the loss of SG heat transfer around 1,400 seconds. A large uncertainty of
nearly 75 psia accumulates around the midpoint of the transient due to cases of extended
CVSP actuation delay. Such cases invoke a large loss of system inventory, allowing for
a more rapid depressurization. It is worth noting that at 5,000 problem time seconds,
in none of the 82 cases was the pressure allowed to reach the ADS-1 closure set point
required to maintain the pressure within the operating map described in Section 4.1.
This is investigated further in an extended nominal case described in Section 7.4.
Uncertainty in PZR collapsed liquid level is given by Figure 7.9, and the trends ap-
pear closely related with overall system pressure. The initial spike from a steady-state
60% collapsed level is due to the power-to-ﬂow mismatch, where the entirety of the PZR
nearly becomes liquid solid. Rapid inventory loss and decrease in RCS mass ﬂow allow
ﬂashing to occur throughout the system, thereby creating a voided region in the PZR
dome. The rapid rises in liquid levels around 1,400 seconds corresponds to the onset
of CVS injection water. Increased uncertainty for the ﬁrst 2,500 seconds is again due
to CVSP injection delays, where a decrease in system inventory causes an increase in
collapsed liquid. Once the injection water is given time to condense any additional ac-
cumulated steam commensurate with delays in actuation, a quasi-steady level of roughly
72% is achieved for the remainder of the transient.
Unbeknownst during the PIRT process, parameters describing conditions in the up-
per plenum regions have been determined to have a large eﬀect on development of the
transient. Due to the presence of super-heated steam in the upper head and plenum,
periodic rapid ﬂashing of liquid in this region is expected to result in a ﬂow reversal
through the core. Figure 7.10 depicts the uncertainty in the collapsed liquid levels in
these regions in meters from the upper core plate. A rapid 50% decrease in liquid level
(from 0.56m) is witnessed during the power-to-ﬂow mismatch period while the system
depressurizes. However, for the remainder of the transient, the rate of depressurization
is able to balance with the net energy balance in the system allowing the collapsed liquid
level in these upper vessel regions to remain stable. The only exception involves signif-
icant delays in CVSP injection, in which case both the upper head and plenum wield
the ability to completely dry out, as shown at the 95th percentile in Figure 7.10. The83
liquid level is seen to quickly recover after subcooled CVS injection water is allowed to
permeate the vessel region. Figure 7.11 summarizes the liquid level activity of a single
case involving a 40 second delay in CVS injection. The rapid, nearly random oscillations,
or ﬂashes, in liquid level are expected to be the drivers of reversed core ﬂow and level
swell in the downcomer regions.
Another highly signiﬁcant parameter is the liquid level in the heated regions of the
core. Such level tracking is made especially important due to the simulated reversal of
core ﬂow due to ﬂashing in the upper head region. Figure 7.12 shows the uncertainty
in core liquid level over the course of the transient. Due to the immediate latching-open
of the ADS-1 valve, an initial loss of ﬂuid inventory is witnessed during the coast-down
of the reactor coolant pumps. After the pumps come to a complete stop, subsequent
draining of the PZR ﬂuid while recovering from the liquid-solid condition and actuation
of the CVSP allows some of the liquid level to recover. Commensurate with the liquid
levels in the upper regions of the vessel, the core level is known to oscillate within about
5% after steady injection of CVS water has begun. Further analysis of the ﬂow regimes in
the heated regions suggest a departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) in the center regions
of the core roughly 2 minutes into the transient. The onset of this ﬂow transition from
bubbly to slug ﬂow is made sooner and more pronounced by a signiﬁcant delay in CVS
injection. Nevertheless, annular vapor ﬂow or total channel dryout was not witnessed
in any case involving CVSP actuation in under 900 seconds when analyzed under un-
certainty. A quasi-steady collapsed liquid level of 72% is expected for the remainder of
the transient. Core liquid temperature is shown in Figure 7.13. A sharp rise is seen in
the early stages of the transient due to the power-to-ﬂow mismatch. another rise is seen
around 1,300 seconds when the degradation of heat transfer to the secondary side has
reached a maximum. The wide uncertainty at the midpoint of the transient is due to
the few cases in which CVSP actuation was delayed signiﬁcantly. These cases lead to a
loss of inventory and subsequent depressurization, as shown in Figure 7.8. This lowers
the temperature of saturation in the core, thereby lowering the maximum core liquid
temperature.84
7.1.2 Conclusions
In the above analysis it was found that a feed-and-bleed in response to a LOFW with
feed delays less than 15 minutes meets the regulatory requirements for PCT with 95%
probability and 95% epistemic uncertainty. Furthermore, it was found that latching of the
ADS valve, as opposed to a ﬂuttering eﬀect, allowed natural circulation to develop such
that all CVS injection water was eventually deposited as vapor from the pressurizer.
Oscillations in core ﬂow direction were witnessed due to the presence of super-heated
regions in the upper head which are expected to cause ﬂashing oscillations. Nearly all of
the relevant response functions were able to reach a quasi-steady value 70 minutes into
the transient. In cases involving signiﬁcant CVS delay, the onset of net heat rejection
following the degradation of secondary heat transfer remains uncertain.85
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Figure 7.1: Distribution of ﬂuid temperatures at the downcomer-to-lower plenum connec-
tions below cold legs 1-4. (Lines shown are upper 95th, mean, and lower 95th percentiles)
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Figure 7.2: Continuous peak cladding temperature measured at the radial center-line of
the heat structure representing peak axial power.86
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Figure 7.3: Uncertainty in mass ﬂow rate from the downcomer (negative direction) to
the core region (positive direction).
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Time (s)
0
20
40
60
80
M
a
s
s
 
F
l
o
w
 
(
k
g
/
s
)
Figure 7.4: Mass ﬂow rate from the downcomer (negative direction) to the core region
(positive direction) involving a 40 second delay in CVSP actuation.87
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Figure 7.5: Net energy balance in primary system using Equation (4.1). Net heat reten-
tion and rejection is denoted by positive and negative values, respectively.
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Figure 7.6: Net energy balance in primary system using Equation (7.1). Net heat reten-
tion and rejection is denoted by positive and negative values, respectively.88
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Figure 7.7: Upper and lower 95th percentiles of collapsed liquid levels in secondary steam
generator boilers.
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Figure 7.8: Uncertainty in pressure measured in upper PZR steam dome.89
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Figure 7.9: Uncertainty in collapsed liquid level in the pressurizer vessel as percent of
total volume.
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Figure 7.10: Uncertainty in collapsed liquid level in the reactor vessel upper plenum.90
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Figure 7.11: Collapsed liquid level in the reactor vessel upper plenum involving a 40
second delay in CVS injection.
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Figure 7.12: Uncertainty in collapsed liquid level in the heated regions of the core as
percent of total volume.91
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Figure 7.13: Uncertainty in average liquid temperature in the heated regions of the core.92
7.2 CVSP Delay Between 900 and 1,100 seconds
7.2.1 Results
A sensitivity study was performed on the feed-and-bleed transient using CVS injection
delays known to reside between the time of secondary heat transfer degradation and
RELAP5 code failure. Such phenomenon are known to occur around 15 and 18.5 min-
utes, respectively. Due to the large time cost in performing these runs, only 10 runs were
acquired with CVSP delays sampled uniformly between 900 and 1,100 seconds, and the re-
sulting response functions were evaluated at their upper and lower 95th percentile values.
Figure 7.14 demonstrates the vast uncertainty in PCT when extended CVS injection
delays are present. At the mean, it is determined that successful injection of sub-cooled
CVS water will sequester the rapid increase in PCT, removing the possibility of perma-
nent core damage and ﬁssion product release. At the upper 95th percentile, a temperature
excursion in PCT is expected to reach nearly 2,750 oF. The resulting sequestration and
controlling of fuel temperature in this case is likely ﬁctitious, due to the inability to
account for fuel swelling/cracking in RELAP5. Furthermore, this type of excursion is
not directly veriﬁable with an IET due to interlocks that protect the APEX Magnesium
Oxide heater rods from temperatures exceeding roughly 800oF. Due to the uniform sam-
pling and poor statistics of cases in this study, a linear interpolation was assumed to be
suﬃcient for assessing the statistical prediction of regulatory failure. In this way, the
percentile was used as a CDF for peak cladding temperatures, using the data gathered
from ten runs as the assumed entire sample space. In this way, it is predicted that per-
forming a feed-and-bleed with CVS injection delay between 900 and 1,100 seconds leads
to a success rate of 70.868%.
System pressure during these cases of extended CVS delay is shown in Figure 7.15.
Up to the point of CVS injection, the proﬁle remains quite similar to the cases involving
relatively rapid CVS injection as shown in Figure 7.8. At the point of CVS injection
around 2000 seconds the system depressurizes rapidly due to signiﬁcant condensation of
voided regions in cold legs 2 & 4, downcomer, and heated core regions. However, the
relatively signiﬁcant loss of liquid inventory caused by extended delay of injection water93
forces a pressure increase around 3,000 seconds, as the CVS injection water re-equilibrates
the liquid inventory needed for a quasi-steady state feed and bleed. Once the liquid level
has reached a steady value, the system again begins to depressurize. Collapsed liquid
level is particularly well behaved for all cases preceding the time of liquid re-equilibration
as shown in Figure 7.16. Cases involving CVSP delays leaning towards the 18.5 minute
upper bound lead to longer times before the liquid level reaches a quasi-steady value of
roughly 72%.
Natural circulation development in terms of core mass ﬂow is shown in Figure 7.17,
and this more accurately reﬂects the chaotic oscillations due to the relatively low number
of code runs used in this analysis. The uncertainty is well behaved prior to the onset
of ﬂuid inventory re-equilibration. Once the liquid inventory begins to achieve a quasi-
steady level, the core ﬂow natural ﬂow oscillations resulting from ﬂashing in the upper
head appear in similar fashion to the cases involving earlier CVS injection.
Net energy balance given in Figure 7.18 demonstrates an extended time of guaran-
teed heat retention in the system at the 95th percentiles. This length of time spans
roughly 1,500 seconds beginning 1,000 seconds into the transient, once the power-to-ﬂow
mismatch has subsided and the secondary heat transfer has suﬃciently degraded. The
smaller number of runs allow for the uncertainty proﬁle to depict the tendency for the
system to oscillate between net heat retention and rejection. Net heat retention is ex-
pected to occur during times of core ﬂow reversal due to upper plenum ﬂashing, where
very little thermal mass is able to escape through hot leg 2 leading to the bleeding ADS-1
valve.
Upper head and core collapsed liquid levels are shown in Figures 7.19 and 7.20, re-
spectively. The upper plenum region is expected to dry out entirely in all cases involving
delays in CVSP actuation for more than 15 minutes. Level recovery time depends exclu-
sively on time of CVS injection and its ability to permeate the core region. Figure 7.20
demonstrates a tendency for the core liquid level to rapidly decrease during the boiling
of system inventory that occurs prior to CVS injection. At roughly 950 seconds into the
transient, the upper regions of the core begin transition from annular ﬂow with large
vapor velocity to pre-CHF dryout over the course of 1-2 minutes. If left unattended, this94
phenomenon quickly creeps down the axial nodes representing the core, signiﬁcantly de-
creasing the liquid presence in this region. Following the injection of CVS water, a nearly
instantaneous transition from dryout to slug ﬂow is achieved. Figure 7.21 demonstrates
a change in core liquid temperature commensurate with the pressure proﬁle shown in
Figure 7.15. Re-establishing the quasi-steady liquid inventory in the core following CVS
injection was found to lead to an increase in pressure during the transient. This subse-
quently leads to an increase in the saturation temperature of liquid present in the core.
Due to the super-heated downcomer walls, heater rod, and upper vessel regions, bulk
boiling occurs continuously in the core, requiring the liquid temperature to map directly
to the saturation temperature in this region.
7.2.2 Conclusions
In a sensitivity study involving ten code runs with CVS injection delays sampled uni-
formly between 15 and 18.5 minutes, it was found that feed-and-bleed is successful in
mitigating PCT excursions under the 2,200oF regulatory guideline with 70.868% proba-
bility. It has been described that RELAP5 wields weaknesses in predicting fuel damage
due to temperature excursions. Thus, simulated phenomenon at the upper 95th per-
centile may be ﬁctitious or optimistic relative to an ITF integral eﬀects test. Momentary
dryout is expected to occur in the upper regions of the heated core with signiﬁcant delays
in CVS injection, and complete dryout of the upper head and plenum regions is expected
for at least 15 minutes. Following the onset of sub-cooled CVS injection water, the sys-
tem experiences a momentary pressure excursion while the liquid inventory reaches a
quasi-steady value. Once this equilibrium collapsed level is observed, continued cooling
and oscillations of ﬂow rates in the core is expected for the remainder of the transient.95
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Figure 7.14: Uncertainty in peak cladding tempurature with CVSP Delay in (900, 1100
seconds)
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Figure 7.15: Uncertainty in reactor coolant system pressure with CVSP Delay in (900,
1100 seconds)96
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Figure 7.16: Uncertainty in collapsed liquid level in the pressurizer with CVSP Delay in
(900, 1100 seconds)
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Figure 7.17: Uncertainty in mass ﬂow rate from the downcomer (negative direction) to
the core region (positive direction) with CVSP Delay in (900, 1100 seconds)97
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Figure 7.18: Net energy balance in primary system using Equation (7.1) with CVSP
Delay in (900, 1100 seconds). Net heat retention and rejection is denoted by positive and
negative values, respectively.
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Figure 7.19: Uncertainty in collapsed liquid level in the reactor vessel upper plenum with
CVSP Delay in (900, 1100 seconds).98
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Figure 7.20: Uncertainty in collapsed liquid level in the heated regions of the core as
percent of total volume with CVSP Delay in (900, 1100 seconds).
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Figure 7.21: Uncertainty in average liquid temperature in the heated regions of the core
with CVSP Delay in (900, 1100 seconds).99
7.3 CVS Injection Occurring After 1,100 seconds
The following sensitivity study concerns the limiting scenario where injection of sub-
cooled CVS water is delayed more than 1,100 seconds after onset of the transient. Such
delays could be attributed to mechanical failure of the CVSP, inadvertent blockage of
feedwater reaching the SG2 lower channel head, or human inexperience or error. RE-
LAP5 fails to continue thermal-hydraulic analysis of a system wielding heat structures
with temperatures greater than 3,000oF. As such, data concerning this study was gath-
ered for as long as core peak heater rod temperature could be maintained below this
value. Ten code runs were used to develop the 95th percentile bands for all response
functions.
Figure 7.22 depicts the onset of the temperature excursion in the heater rods whilst
no CVS injection is utilized. The excursion is expected to begin around 1,025 seconds
into the transient if no coolant is introduced to the system. During the excursion, an
average rate of temperature increase is found to be 12.2oF/s. The tendency for the rod
temperature to linearly reach the 3,000oF limit is likely ﬁctitious, as RELAP5 does not
contain subroutines to calculate fuel damage expected to occur at these temperatures.
Table 7.1 summarizes the uncertainty in predicting RELAP5 code failure times, and
expected time for PCT breach of the 2,200oF regulatory limit.
Table 7.1: Uncertainty in failure times for PCT regulatory breach and RELAP5 code
failures with CVSP delay > 1,100 sec.
PCT Regulatory Breach (s) RELAP5 Code Failure (s)
Lower 95th Percentile 1128.374 1211.164
Average 1149.224 1246.723
Upper 95th Percentile 1171.657 1287.792100
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Figure 7.22: Uncertainty in peak cladding tempurature with CVSP Delay > 1,100 seconds
7.4 Long-term Feed-and-Bleed Analysis at Nominal State
This ﬁnal sensitivity study sought to analyze the development of the feed-and-bleed tran-
sient using a single code run with parameters sampled at their nominal state out to 20,000
problem time seconds. The motivation for shortening the transient for the UQ purposes
described in Section 7.1 is due to the insurmountable time cost in running this transient,
which required nearly a day of computing time. Nominal CVSP delay was estimated
to be 600 seconds, which allows the system to fall within the operating pressure band,
and gives the steam generators ability to remove the bulk of heat generated during the
power-to-ﬂow mismatch period. More so, a ten minute delay in coolant injection allows
for proper stratiﬁcation in the upper plenum and hot legs to occur such that nearly 100%
steam may be fed through the surge line and bled from the ADS-1 valve, optimizing heat
rejection from the bleed.101
7.4.1 Results
Peak cladding temperature is shown in Figure 7.23, and is found to not be purely mono-
tonically decreasing with time. The peaks seen to occur in the PCT proﬁle closely
coincide with those witnessed in the system pressure proﬁle of Figure 7.24, occurring
around 8,500 seconds and 15,400 seconds. The development of these pressure excursions
is due to the allowance of ﬂuttering in the ADS-1 valve upon reaching the lower pressure
limit of 145 psia derived using an APEX-speciﬁc operating map (see Section 4.2.2). The
trip used to model this set-point is non-latching, meaning steam is again bled from the
pressurizer upon falling within the operating band. This decision was made to avoid
the development of a liquid solid RCS and PZR at the later stages of the feed-and-bleed
when system energy has signiﬁcantly diminished. As such, closure of the ADS valve at
low pressures thereby increases the pressure in the overall system, subsequently increasing
the volume-averaged saturation temperature throughout the core. This can be seen in
Figure 7.25, where the liquid temperature in the core closely follows the pressure proﬁle.
As the liquid temperature in the core increases, the energy deposition from the heat rods
degrades, leading to periods of moderate heat retention in the fuel.
Mass ﬂow rate from the lower plenum to the core is shown in Figure 7.26. The oscil-
lations due to ﬂashing in the upper plenum are prevalent for the entirety of the transient,
and appear to be unaﬀected by the ﬂuttering of the ADS-1 valve upon reaching the lower
operating pressure setpoint. These oscillations continue to cause rapid periods of heat
retention in the system as shown in Figure 7.27 due to rapid changes in the mass and
velocity of steam delivered to hot leg 2. At the average, the feed-and-bleed process is
shown to allow for net heat rejection from the system before accounting for environmental
heat loss eﬀects.
Figure 7.28 demonstrates the quasi-steady collapsed liquid level in the pressurizer is
highly dependent on continuous bleeding from the ADS-1 valve. Upon closure of the valve
at 8,500 seconds and 15,400 seconds, the voiding in the system due to the large amount
of liquid at the saturation point stops. This provides an inﬂux of saturated and sub-
cooled water to the RCS and PZR, decreasing the collapsed liquid level. It is found that
after re-instantiating of ADS bleeding, the collapsed liquid level resumes its slow quasi-102
steady incline. Closing the valve at 15,400 seconds where the core decay has substantially
decreased results in a more signiﬁcant production of sub-cooled liquid, further collapsing
the voided dome. Thus, it is expected that at transient times exceeding 20,000 seconds,
and operator would then lower the ADS-1 set-point to avoid total collapse of the voided
dome in the pressurizer. This is acceptable from an operating map standpoint, as the
ﬂat core power line shown in Figure 4.3 is continuously falling with time in reality.
Liquid level in the core is seen to respond in similar fashion to ﬂuttering of the ADS-1
valve as shown in Figure 7.30. The presence of super-heated heater rods in the core
causes the development of subcooled liquid in the core during periods of pressure spikes
to be extremely unlikely. Thus, liquid generation certainly remains at the saturation
temperature during the excursion, leading to the smaller increases in collapsed liquid
level of the core relative to the pressurizer. Figure 7.29 depicts hardly any change in
the liquid levels in the upper plenum regions due to the existence of highly super heated
steam in this region on the order of 5-10 K above expected saturation temperatures.
The diﬀerence between these temperatures converges with time and pressure excursions,
suggesting an excursion in increased collapsed liquid level in the upper head and plenum
regions in the near future.
7.4.2 Conclusions
In the preceding analysis, it was found that the feed-and-bleed transient maintained
adequate safety margins in PCT for up to 20,000 seconds using nominal APEX input
parameters for a single run. During this time, pressure was able to enact ADS-1 valve
ﬂuttering and a system-wide increase in collapsed liquid level was witnessed with each
valve closure. It was determined that after 20,000 seconds, a lowering of the ADS-1 valve
lower setpoint pressure is needed to avoid a collapse of the steam dome in the pressurizer.
At the termination of this transient, the feed-and-bleed was found to remove an average
33.46 kW of power without accounting for the additional loss due to environmental heat
transfer.103
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Figure 7.23: Peak cladding temperature proﬁle using nominal APEX input parameters.
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Figure 7.24: System pressure proﬁle measured in PZR dome using nominal APEX input
parameters.104
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Figure 7.25: Volume-averaged liquid temperature in the heated regions of the core using
nominal APEX input parameters.
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Figure 7.26: Mass ﬂow rate from the downcomer (negative direction) to the core region
(positive direction) using nominal APEX input parameters.105
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Figure 7.27: Net energy balance in primary system using Equation (7.1) using nominal
APEX input parameters. Net heat retention and rejection is denoted by positive and
negative values, respectively.106
5000 10000 15000 20000
Time (s)
50
60
70
80
90
100
C
o
l
l
a
p
s
e
d
 
L
i
q
u
i
d
 
L
e
v
e
l
 
(
%
)
Figure 7.28: Uncertainty in collapsed liquid level in the pressurizer using nominal APEX
input parameters.
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Figure 7.29: Uncertainty in collapsed liquid level in the reactor vessel upper plenum using
nominal APEX input parameters.107
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Figure 7.30: Uncertainty in collapsed liquid level in the heated regions of the core as
percent of total volume using nominal APEX input parameters.108
Chapter 8: Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the modern CSAU
method in using the best-estimate plus uncertainty approach to quantifying reactor safety
margins. The Bayesian paradigm of statistical inference was used to determine the num-
ber of samples required to reach 95/95 probability/conﬁdence knowledge of PCT resulting
from a LOFW accident applied to the OSU APEX integral test facility. This analysis
explores the sensitivity of input parameters on the results of PCT using a primary feed-
and-bleed response to the transient. The uncertainties of the input parameters treatable
by the thermal hydraulic code RELAP5 were propagated using a multitude of runs to
determine the overall uncertainty in the success of the primary feed-and-bleed response
method.
8.1 Success of Modern CSAU
Expedition of the CSAU methodology was achieved in coupling the statistical power of
the DAKOTA code with RELAP5 Mod 3.3 using the SNAP interface. To date this is
expected to be the inaugural formal usage of the SNAP forward uncertainty propaga-
tion capabilities to perform a full-scale CSAU analysis of an integral test facility. The
modularity of the SNAP concept allows this analysis to be rapidly reproduced or up-
dated if such analysis is warranted. It is expected that many months of man-hours have
been eliminated in using the above approach by automating the tasks of PDF sampling,
parallel computing, restart plot data extraction, product-moment correlation calculation,
and uncertainty analysis. More so, the novel Bayesian analysis presented in Section 2.5.3
should present greater justiﬁcation to the safety margins as opposed to methods using
interval statistics, while greatly reducing the mathematical complexity that was inherent
in the response surface methods.109
8.2 Uncertainty Results
As part of the light-water reactor sustainability program, the OSU APEX facility, a
volumetric/time-scaled model of the Westinghouse AP1000, was chosen as the plant to
analyze. This is a four-loop reactor utilizing natural circulation by taking advantage of
gravity-driven forces. The primary feed-and-bleed study was commenced by creating an
operating pressure map where the APEX conditions were expected to be advantageous
for successful heat removal in response to a LOFW accident. Uncertain probability den-
sity distributions were applied to 21 input parameters with one additional hot-channel
bias which was found to be unnecessary. These input distributions were developed using
the CSNI literature review method, with heavy emphasis on the Westinghouse feed-line
break PIRT and light use of expert opinion within OSU. A preliminary sensitivity study
predicted that human uncertainty in coolant injection timing dominates the response in
PCT in a monotonic fashion. Other signiﬁcant contributors were found to be fuel-related
parameters such as fouling of heat transfer, power decay uncertainty, and fuel stored
energy at time of transient.
The signiﬁcance of human uncertainty’s contribution to PCT response lead to three
sensitivity studies based upon time of CVC injection. The studies involved CVS injection
delay before 900 seconds, between 900 and 1,100 seconds, and extending beyond 1,100
seconds. Within these three sensitivity studies, latin-hypercube sampling was used to
sample from the input PDFs including the CVS injection delay. For successful cooling
of the core using a primary feed-and-bleed with 95% probability and conﬁdence, CVS
injection requires actuation before 900 seconds. It was found that with all combined
uncertainty in this sensitivity study, PCT will decrease monotonically with time.
Between 900 and 1,100 seconds, primary feed-and-bleed is successful in limiting a
PCT excursion below 2,200 oF 70.868% of the time. This uncertainty in success rate is a
product of the diﬀerences in CVS injection time and uncertainty in fuel-related parame-
ters.
After 1,100 seconds, breaching of the regulatory limit for PCT is expected 100% of
the time, regardless of uncertainty in fuel-related parameters and feed-and-bleed oper-110
ating conditions. More so, it has been shown that RELAP5 Mod 3.3 predicts runaway
temperature excursions for the PCT which is not abated when CVS injection ﬁnally does
occur.
In all cases, it was determined that unstable ﬂow phenomena exists in the form
of natural-circulation ﬂow rate oscillation in the core and downcomer regions. Highly
superheated steam in the upper head and plenum regions of the RPV lead to instances
of bulk ﬂashing, causing increased pressure in the core and subsequent level swell in
the downcomer. These instances of reverse ﬂow cause energy deposited from the fuel to
be retained in the system, leading to periods of net heat retention. Further study has
concluded that while collapsed liquid level will nearly always fall below the top of active
fuel regions in cases of successful cooling, onset of total dryout or annular mist conditions
is never present in the core. A ﬁnal nominal long-term study of feed-and-bleed response
has shown the response to be eﬀective in removing heat from the core regions indeﬁnitely.
8.3 Future Work
The analysis herein supports the light-water sustainability program and future NGSAC
validation and veriﬁcation. A large amount of test data has been made available for direct
comparison to an APEX facility primary feed-and-bleed integral eﬀects test. Immediate
further study will involve the accumulation of APEX response under experimental mea-
surement uncertainty, granting the ability to perform a band-to-band validation of this
study.
To support NGSAC eﬀorts, the APEX facility is expected to ﬁnish development in
the RELAP7 graphical user environment and undergo a primary feed-and-bleed response
in similar manner to this analysis. The automated uncertainty analysis inherent in this
next-generation thermal-hydraulic software would allow a band-to-band validation to
determine the current accuracy of updated closure relations and correlations used in RE-
LAP7.
Finally, the onset of natural circulation oscillation predicted in this study invites
further analysis using a 3-dimensional thermal hydraulic package using CFD. This would111
grant the ability to determine the eﬀect of cross-ﬂow at both the CVC injection point,
downcomer, and core regions.112
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95/95 95% aleatory variability (probability), 95% epistemic uncertainty (con-
ﬁdence)
ACC Accumulator
ADS Automatic Depressurization System
APEX Advanced Plant Experiment
ASTRUM Automated Statistical Treatment of Uncertainty Method
BEPU Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty
BWR Boiling Water Reactor
CCTF Cylindrical Core Test Facility
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CL Cold Leg
CMT Core Makeup Tank
CSAU Code Scaling, Applicability, and Uncertainty
CSNI Nuclear Energy Agency Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations
CVS Chemical and Volume Control System
DAKOTA Design Analysis Kit for Optimization and Terascale Applications
DNB Departure from Nucleate Boiling
DNBR Departure from Nuclear Boiling Ratio118
DVI Direct Vessel Injection
EMDAP Evaluation Model Development and Assessment Process
F&B Feed-and-bleed
FUP Forward Uncertainty Propagation
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HPIS High Pressure Injection System
HTC Heat Transfer Coeﬃcient
IET Integral Eﬀects Test
IMTHUA Integrated Methodology on Thermal Hydraulics Uncertainty Analysis
INL Idaho National Laboratory
IRWST In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank
LB-LOCA Large Break Loss-of-coolant Accident
LHS Latin Hypercube Sampling
LOFT Loss of Fluids Tests (INL Facility)
LOFW Loss of Feedwater
LSTF Large Scale Test Facility
LWR Light Water Reactor
MC Monte Carlo
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
PCC Pearson’s product-moment Correlation Coeﬃcient
PCT Peak Cladding Temperature119
PDF Probability Distribution Function
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PORV Power Operated Relief Valve
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
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PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
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RMS Root Mean Square
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SA Sensitivity Analysis
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TPG Technical Program Group
UMAE Uncertainty Method based on Accuracy Extrapolation
UPTF Upper Plenum Test Facility
UQ Uncertainty Quantiﬁcation
USNRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Appendix A: Random Input Sampling and the Wilks Method
When using the method of forward uncertainty propagation, the simplest and most fre-
quently used method of sampling is to randomly sample a number of points within input
space. Monte Carlo sampling involves the use of a pseudo-random number generator,
and maps this number to a CDF via the inverse cumulative distribution method. Con-
trarily, Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) divides the input space into even intervals of
equal probability, subsequently selecting values at random once a particular interval has
been chosen to sample from. The LHS method is a specialized form of the more general
stratiﬁed and Monte Carlo sampling techniques. The use of LHS allows the input sets
found using PDF stratiﬁcation to undergo permutation using a statistical technique of
randomization. Power of the LHS technique lies in the ability to permute the inputs
based on dependencies described using correlation matrices, if such dependencies exist.
There is agreement between industry and academia that LHS generally produces more
precise results than basic stratiﬁed or MC techniques.[8] Latin Hypercube sampling poses
as the superior technique when the number of code runs is small, due to its ability to
properly sample the population residing in the tails of a distribution. When sampling
randomly, uniform weight is given to the domain of the PDF enabling regions to be
missed entirely when limiting the number of samples made.[7] This lack of resolution
in the Monte Carlo method undermines the goal of limiting the uncertainty propagated
through the computational analysis. Therefore, LHS is frequently hailed as the superior
sampling method, and was the method used in this analysis.
Due to the inherent black box approach of the forward uncertainty propagation, both
the sensitivity analysis and uncertainty quantiﬁcation are intimately related. Once the
most powerful independent variables in relation to the ﬁgure of merit value and their
distribution functions are chosen, one must determine the limiting number of samples
that must be taken to achieve a speciﬁed probability and conﬁdence band. The Wilks
Method derived from interval statistics is most frequently used to achieve this criteria.[5]
The result of the Wilks Method is typically shown in its ﬁnal analytic form, or in tabular123
format with industry standard conﬁdence and probability values (e.g. 95/95). It is the
motivation of this section to properly demonstrate the simplicity and power of the Wilks
Method for sampling justiﬁcation starting from basic interval statistics.[51]
The Wilks Method rests on the assumption that quality assurance practices in place
covering variables of interest are robust enough to consider the universe a purely statistical
one. In other words, all assignable causes of variability in a variable (e.g. a pressure
sensor) have been eliminated, and the residual variability in the variable is assumed to
be purely random. This enables us to assign the random variability a static distribution
function, f(x). Assuming a distribution with tails that extend to inﬁnity, dividing the
input space into k intervals each with their own probability pi and number of values ni,
the multinomial distribution law of Equation (A.1) may be applied,
n!
n1!n2!...n k!
= p
n1
1 p
n2
2 ...p
nk
k . (A.1)
In order to achieve a tractable distribution for analytically describing the interval method,
Wilks suggests ﬁve intervals. In reality, this has no eﬀect on the goal of solving for n,
the total number of samples, in that we are only interested in the probability at ei-
ther fringe. Thus, we assume intervals I1 through I5 of ( 1,x r),(xr,x r + dxr),(xr +
dxr,x n r+1),(xn r+1,x n r+1 + dxn r+1), and (xn r+1 + dxn r+1,1). The order r en-
ables us to choose the number of samples we wish to remove from the tails to achieve
our probability/conﬁdence criteria, and xr/xn r+1 are the lower and upper tolerance
limits, respectively. dxr and dxn r+1 are deﬁned to contain one sample (the tolerance
limit) each, and are deﬁned to enable analytic inference from this method, as to be
demonstrated shortly. Thus, the ﬁve intervals wield r 1,1,n 2r,1, and r 1 samples,
respectively. Plugging in the sample counts and distribution functionf(x) into Equation
(A.1), we achieve,
n!
⇥
(r   1)2(n   2r)!
⇤
 Z xr
 1
f(x)dx
! Z 1
xn r+1
f(x)dx
!
(A.2)
·
 Z xn r+1
xr
f(x)dx
!
f(xr)f(xn r+1)dxrdxn r+1,124
where the ﬁnal two terms are achieved in making the following area extrapolation as-
sumptions,
Z xr+dxr
xr
f(x)dx ⇡ f(xr)dxr
Z xn r+1+dxn r+1
xn r+1
f(x)dx ⇡ f(xn r+1)dxn r+1.
Finally, instituting a change of variables such that u =
R xr
 1 f(x)dx and v =
R 1
xn r+1 f(x)dx
where subsequently the diﬀerentials become du = f(xr)dxr and dv =  f(xn r+1)dxn r+1,
the multinomial distribution becomes,
n!
⇥
(r   1)2(n   2r)!
⇤ur 1vr 1(1   u   v)n 2rdudv. (A.3)
Equation (A.3) represents the probability element with independent truncation probabil-
ities u and v. As such, it is more descriptive to think of Equation (A.3) as a conﬁdence
element. Derivations of both the one-sided and two-sided tolerance ranges are demon-
strated below.
A.1 One-sided Tolerance Limits
While the conﬁdence element of Equation (A.3) was developed allowing for unequal
tolerance ranges on either side of the distribution, the probabilities u and v do not
correspond to a speciﬁc side. Thus, in order to achieve a one-sided element one simply
uses the statistical technique of marginalization over one of the independent variables as
shown in Equation (A.4),
Z
n!
⇥
(r   1)2(n   2r)!
⇤ur 1vr 1(1 u v)n 2rdudv =
n!
⇥
(r   1)(n   r)!
⇤ur 1(1 u)n rdu
(A.4)
As previously mentioned, common practice is to set the order r equal to one.[4] [2] This
ensures that the requested probability and conﬁdence is met by setting the single highest
or lowest value as the tolerance limit. This causes the one-sided conﬁdence element of125
Equation (A.4) to collapse to the following form,
n
Z 1 ↵
0
(1   u)n 1du    . (A.5)
The modern-day nomenclature has been used in Equation (A.5) where the proportion
of the distribution remaining after the truncation of the tails is ↵,a n dt h em i n i m u m
conﬁdence in this remainder is  .[29] While in its current form, Equation (A.5) looks for
the proportion of total probability one wishes to truncate. Performing a quick change of
variables by letting ⇠ =( 1  u),d⇠=  du, we achieve the conﬁdence element n
R 1
↵ ⇠n 1d⇠.
This results in the one-sided conﬁdence rule familiar to analysts relying on random or
incremental sampling techniques,
1   ↵n    . (A.6)
Equation (A.6) states that in a further theoretical, indeﬁnitely large sample, the conﬁ-
dence is   that the proportion of values not exceeding xr (assuming an upper tolerance
limit) is ↵ if n initial samples are to be taken.[52] As such, the Wilks Method is very
much embedded into the frequentist paradigm of statistics, as opposed to a subjective
(Bayesian) one.
A.2 Two-sided Tolerance Limits
In the special case where it is assumed desired that both the upper and lower truncation
contains equal proportions of the distribution, one may utilize the marginalized one-
sided conﬁdence element and simply raise the order by one. In this way, after a number
of samples the highest and lowest values are discarded, and the speciﬁed proportion and
conﬁdence are satisﬁed. Letting the order r =2 , Equation (A.4) becomes,
n(n   1)
Z 1 ↵
0
u(1   u)n 2du. (A.7)
Again, letting ⇠ =( 1  u) and d⇠ =  du, the conﬁdence element becomes,
n(n   1)
Z 1
↵
(⇠n 2   ⇠n 1)d⇠.126
Performing the integration and collecting terms, the familiar two-sided Wilks Formula is
aquired as per Equation (A.8),
n↵n 1   (n   1)↵n   1    . (A.8)
Equation (A.8) demonstrates a conﬁdence of   that the proportion of samples residing
between the truncated limits of x1 and xn (due to an order of 2) in an indeﬁnitely large
sample size following n samples is ↵.[52]
A.3 Applying the Wilks Formulas
While the one and two-sided Wilks formulas of Equations (A.6) and (A.8) are a rela-
tively straightforward numerical solve with modern mathematical software, it is enviable
to develop a robust algorithm that may be used to ascertain sample requirements when
conditions are changed. More importantly, it becomes obvious that the aforementioned
Wilks formulas break down when one is interested in quantifying the uncertainty of many
response functions or ﬁgures of merit (FOMs). Assuming statistical independence, the
conﬁdence elements of the truncated proportions of each FOM are simply multiplied, and
the integration is carried out similar to the previous cases. However, the addition of even
a few FOMs lead to this method becoming intractable.
A high-level programming language and simple iteration can be used to return the
number of samples required for any number of FOMs. The following example was written
using the c++ programming language:
// A fast algorithm for sample # determination
// using the Wilks Method
// Required inputs :
// R = # of FOMS, C = Confidence , P = Probability
//
// main.cpp127
// Factorial
//
// Created by Brian Hallee on 6/28/12.
// Copyright (c) 2012 Oregon State University . All rights reserved .
//
#include <iostream>
#include <cmath>
using namespace std;
int factorial(int x, int result);
double wilks (int R, double C, double p);
double power (double a, double b, double res);
int main (int argc , const char ⇤ argv [])
{
R=⇤⇤User Defined⇤⇤;
C=⇤⇤User Defined⇤⇤;
p=⇤⇤User Defined⇤⇤;
cout < < wilks(R, C, p) < < endl;
return 0;
}
int factorial(int x, int result)
{
if (x = = 1)
return result;
if (x = = 0)
return result;
else
return factorial(x   1, x ⇤ result);128
}
double wilks (int R, double C, double p)
{
int n=0 ;
double beta = 0;
double product;
while (beta < C)
{
beta = 0;
n=n+1 ;
for ( int j=0 ; j<n  R; j++)
{
double p1 = factorial (n,1);
double p2 = p1/factorial (j ,1);
double p3 = p2/factorial (n j,1);
double p4 = power(p, j ,1);
double p5 = power(1 p,n  j,1);
product = p3⇤p4⇤p5;
beta = beta + product;
}
}
return n;
}
double power (double a, double b, double res)
{129
if (b = = 1)
return a ⇤ res;
if (b = = 0)
return 1;
else
return power(a, b 1, a⇤res);
}130
Appendix B: Raw Mathematica Input Needed for Iterative Bayesian
Updating
The following raw input was used to construct the tabulated sampling requirements using
the iterative Bayesian method for the APEX1000 feed-and-bleed experiment. Signiﬁcant
input or user-deﬁned numerics are commentated with short descriptions. Descriptions of
the theory and application of the methods used here are given in Sections 2.5.3 and 6.4,
respectively.
Deﬁne the normal distribution mean:
\[M u] = .5 (.6373 + .99)
Numerically solve for the standard deviation:
Solve[{(1 + Erf[(0.6373   \[M u])/Sqrt[2⇤x^2]])/(1 +
Erf[(0.99   \[M u])/Sqrt[2⇤x^2]]) = = .01/.99}, x]
(Optional) Generate a PDF plot to ensure accuracy of the previous solution:
Plot[PDF[NormalDistribution[\[M u] , 0.0758055], x] , {x, 0, 1},
Filling  >A x i s
]
(Optional) Generate a CDF plot to ensure accuracy of the previous solution:
Plot[CDF[NormalDistribution[\[M u] , 0.0758055], x] , {x, 0, 1},
Filling  >A x i s ]
Generate a table of code run values:
y=T a b l e [ i, { i, 5 0 0 } ] ;131
(User-deﬁned Numeric) Set the number of requested code failures:
fail = 10;
Deﬁne and solve for the posterior predictive distribution as a function of code success
probability z:
Post[z_] =
z^(y   fail)⇤(1   z)^(fail)⇤
Exp[ 1/2⇤(z   0.81365)^2/(0.0758055)^2]/
NIntegrate[
x^(y   fail)⇤(1   x)^(fail)⇤
Exp[ 1/2⇤(x   0.81365)^2/(0.0758055)^2], {x, 0, 1}];
Deﬁne and solve for the conﬁdence distribution as a function of code success probability
z:
CDFPost[z_] = 1   NIntegrate[Post[z] , {z, 0, .95}];
(Optional) Generate a list plot to assess the ﬁdelity of the resulting conﬁdence distribu-
tion:
ListPlot[CDFPost[z]]
Export the tabulated conﬁdence distribution data to a Microsoft Excel R   workbook:
Export["out.dat",{ { 1 ,5 0 0 } ,C D F P o s t [ z ] } ]